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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLES

THE PIONEER SPIRIT AND THE PUBLIC TRUST: THE
AMERICAN RULE OF CAPTURE AND STATE OWNERSHIP OF
WILDLIFE
BY
MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & LUCUS RITCHIE**

The law of capture, a central feature in Anglo-American property
law, has deep historical roots, running at least to Rome, where
capturers could create private property in res nullius resources like
wildlife (ferae naturae) if they did so consistent with Roman law
(imperium). When transferred to English common law, capture
doctrine was laden with pervasive restrictions imposed by royal
prerogatives, as the English king was said to own wildlife that had been
unowned in Rome. Thus, royal forests and hunting franchises imposed
substantial limits on wildlife capture.
In early America, the lack of royal prerogatives seemed for a time
to sanction a free-wheeling rule of wildlife capture unknown in
England. For example, the English rule allowing landowners to exclude
capturers was largely discarded, at least with respect to unfenced
lands. But as the overharvesting consequences of expansive capture
rules became apparent, American courts rediscovered and
“republicanized” the royal prerogatives into the concept of state
ownership of wildlife. This 19th century development was grounded on
both sovereign power and public ownership principles, or “sovereign
ownership,” a concept endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1896.
Although during the 20th century the Supreme Court repeatedly
limited the state ownership of wildlife where it conflicted with federal
*
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law—and finally overturned the case that endorsed the doctrine in
1979—today nearly every state claims ownership of wildlife. This
article examines this phenomenon and explains both the limits and
utility of the state ownership doctrine in the 21st century. We claim that
although modern notions of the police power justify expansive state
regulation of wildlife, the state ownership doctrine retains vitality
because it may bolster or enlarge police power regulation by 1)
imposing affirmative duties to protect wildlife, 2) empowering states to
collect damage for damages to wildlife, and 3) offering an affirmative
defense against landowner claims of constitutional takings due habitat
protections.
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It is fitting that as part of the Lewis and Clark Bicentennial,

Environmental Law should publish a symposium on the rule of capture1
because during the expedition, in 1805, the New York Supreme Court
decided Pierson v. Post,2 the famous fox case that firmly established the rule
of capture on American soil. Capture principles subsequently became a
central feature of American natural resources law, especially in allocating
private rights to public resources like water, minerals, and wildlife. Law
students are often taught the importance of the rule of capture at the outset
of their first-year courses in property,3 and the leading texts on natural
resources law feature the rule of capture.4 Capture is, in short, a central
feature of the American law of natural resources allocation.
Capture achieved this prominence largely through pedigree. The origins
of the capture doctrine run deep, traceable in Western law at least to Rome,
where the concept of res nullius (unowned property) enabled capturers to
create private property in communal resources.5 Capture doctrine was
transformed in English law to accommodate a strong dose of royal
prerogative, under which the king owned wildlife and capturers required
royal permission or acquiescence to obtain private rights in wildlife.6
Transported across the Atlantic, the capture doctrine was altered
substantially by the American experience. In the early nineteenth century,
America embraced a freewheeling rule of capture unknown in England.7
Before long, however, American courts and legislatures used the precedent
of the royal prerogative to articulate a doctrine of state ownership of
wildlife, equipping regulators with plenary authority to control harvests.8
That public ownership concept was successfully challenged by federal
authority,9 but absent federal-state conflict, it continues to endure today, as
virtually all states claim ownership of wildlife in trust for their citizens.10
Throughout its long history, capture doctrine has been modified to fit
1 The Rule of Capture symposium, held in April 2005, was the second of a planned trilogy
of symposia commemorating the Lewis and Clark Bicentenary. The first, on the Discovery
Doctrine, took place in 2004. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine:

Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern
Natural Resource Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713 (2004). The final symposium, with
a working title of Western In-Stream Flows: Fifty Years of Progress and Setbacks, is scheduled
for 2006.
2 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); see infra notes 24, 86–87 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 19–59 (5th ed. 2002); JOSEPH
WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 50–82 (2d ed. 1997); SHELDON.
F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENCAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 8–19 (4th
ed. 2003); JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 23–31 (2000).
4 See, e.g., GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW
510–13, 583–614 (5th ed. 2002); JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 746–
60, 1033–56 (2004); CHRISTINE A. KLEIN ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF
PROBLEMS AND CASES 440–59, 843–62 (2005); DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 98–200 (2002) [hereinafter GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW].
5 See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
6 See infra Part II.B.
7 See infra Part III.A.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See infra Part V.
10 See infra Parts VI.B & C.
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the felt necessities of the times. Roman law subjected capture to the
regulatory power of the state.11 Medieval English law recognized royal
ownership of wildlife and the plenary proprietary power of the king.12 Later
English law granted landowners constructive possession of wildlife
inhabiting their lands.13 Early American law observed an expansive rule of
capture. But by the mid-nineteenth century, American law subjected
capturers’ rights to the states, who “owned” the wildlife within their
borders.14 Capture doctrine, in short, has never been static: it has always
evolved. Moreover, this study shows that capture doctrine has never been
fully separated from the concept of state regulation or state ownership.
Indeed, the latter is an integral element of the former. This Article examines
the evolution of capture doctrine from Roman to English to American law.
Part II outlines the Roman and English capture rules, emphasizing the
restrictions on capture imposed by the king’s creation of royal forests and
hunting franchises—manifestations of royal prerogative. Part III examines
the role of capture in early America, in which a free-take rule seemed to
dominate for a time, but whose consequences quickly led to adoption of
state-imposed restrictions. Section IV explains that these restrictions were
the consequence of the rise of state ownership—a descendant of the royal
prerogative. As section IV suggests, American law distinguished state
ownership from royal prerogative by articulating that ownership was in trust
for the benefit of the public, the so-called “wildlife trust.”
The Supreme Court originally interpreted the plenary power of this
doctrine to enable states to exclude wildlife harvests from interstate
transport,15 but as described in Part V, the Court eventually ruled that the
state ownership doctrine was subject to federal constitutional restrictions.
Nevertheless, part VI demonstrates that state ownership of wildlife in trust
for the people remains a dominant force in American law, equipping states
with broad powers to conserve wildlife. Part VII explains why recognizing
the proprietary powers of the wildlife ownership doctrine is important, quite
apart from any police powers states may possess to regulate wildlife. These
reasons include that the wildlife trust may impose affirmative duties on
states to protect wildlife, may empower states to collect damages from those
injuring wildlife, and may insulate states from takings claims when they act
pursuant to the wildlife trust. The Article concludes that, properly
understood, the rule of capture of wildlife and state ownership of wildlife
are not separable concepts but inextricably connected parts of the American
law of wildlife regulation.
II. ORIGINS OF THE RULE OF CAPTURE: WILDLIFE APPROPRIATION IN ROMAN AND
ENGLISH LAW
Wildlife capture principles are traceable to Roman law, but Roman law
11
12
13
14
15

See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 34–65 and accompanying text.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.C.
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recognized the authority of the state to regulate capture. When English law
inherited capture doctrine from the Romans, it too subjected capturers of
wildlife to the authority of the state to control capture, although it did so by
introducing the concept of royal ownership of wildlife—a doctrine that
would later influence American law.

A. Roman Roots
Like much of modern Western property law, the rule of capture of
wildlife originated in Roman law.16 Roman jurists accepted without
argument that animals ferae naturae were capable of qualified private
ownership.17 Indeed, Romans believed that private ownership was natural.18
Romans classified property as belonging to one of two broad
categories: res extra patrimonium (things owned by no individual in
particular) and res in patrimonium (things owned by someone).19 There
were three categories of res extra patrimonium: 1) res publicae (things
owned by the state), 2) res communes (things owned in common), and 3) res
nullius (things owned by no one).20 Res publicae included roads, ports,
rivers, and public buildings.21 Res communes—things belonging to the
people in common—included air, running water, and the sea and its
shores.22 Along with unoccupied lands, precious stones, and the property of
an enemy captured in battle, wild animals were labeled as res nullius—
things capable of individual appropriation, but which belonged to no one
until a human took possession by occupatio (the natural method of
occupation).23 In the case of wildlife, occupation occurred when an animal
16 For commentary discussing the effect of Roman property law on Anglo-American
jurisprudence generally, see ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1993); DONALD R. KELLEY, THE HUMAN MEASURE: SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE WESTERN
LEGAL TRADITION (1990).
17 See generally J. INST. 2.1.12; G. INST. 2.66–.67; ALAN WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN THE
LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1968) [hereinafter WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY].
18 See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 110 (1954) (arguing that
Roman jurists “conceived that most things were destined by nature to be controlled by man.
Such control expressed their natural purpose.”); KELLEY, supra note 16, at 49 (“In the most
fundamental way . . . Roman jurisprudence was anthropocentric.”).
19 W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 182 (3d ed.
1963); Steven M. Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
471, 503 (1996).
20 BUCKLAND, supra note 19, at 182–83. These distinctions were not always firm in Roman
law. For example, Marcian and Justinian classified seashores as res communes, while Celcius
classified them as res publicae, and Neratius treated them as res nullius. Id. at 184–85. See also
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475 (1970) (noting that the categories of common properties
under Roman law were often confused).
21 J. INST. 2.1.2; DIG. 1.8.5 (Gaius, Everyday Matters or Golden Words 2); RUDOLPH SOHM,
THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 303 (James C.
Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907).
22 J. INST. 2.1.1; DIG. 1.8.2 (Marcian, Institutes 3); SOHM, supra note 21, at 303.
23 Wise, supra note 19, at 508; SOHM, supra note 21, at 304. See also BARRY NICHOLAS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 130–31 (1962) (“[T]he only res nullius which are commonly
encountered in everyday life are wild animals and it is in regard to them that occupatio is
mainly discussed.”).
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was physically captured.24
According to Justinian, “wild animals, birds and fish, i.e., all animals
born on land or in the sea or air, as soon as they are caught by anyone,
forthwith fall into his ownership by the law of nations; for what previously
belonged to no one is, by natural reason, awarded to its captor.”25 Despite
this broad statement of capture principles, however, Roman citizens’ right to
take wildlife was not absolute.26 While rarely employed, the Roman state
maintained the sovereign power (imperium) to control the harvest of
animals ferae naturae.27 In addition, Roman law recognized land ownership
as a restriction on capture. Although trespassing hunters could lawfully take
wild animals on another’s land,28 landowners had the authority to physically
exclude hunters from their land pre-capture.29 The Roman rule of capture,
while granting freedom to take animals in most circumstances, never
permitted an unrestricted harvest.

24 Early Roman jurists disagreed as to the degree of control necessary before an animal lost
its natural liberty. One jurist determined that the wounding of a wild animal was sufficient to
establish ownership so long as the chase continued unabated. DIG. 41.1.5 (Gaius, Common
Matters or Golden Words 2) (describing an opinion authored by Trebatius). Another claimed,
however, that physical capture was required for property rights to attach to the pursued game.
DIG. 41.1.55 (Proculus, Letters 2). Justinian and Gaius each adopted the latter view, thereby
establishing the prevailing rule for the Roman period: capture was required before a wild animal
could be reduced to private property. J. INST. 2.1.13; DIG. 41.1.5 (Gaius, Common Matters or
Golden Things 2); WATSON, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 17, at 47.
The debate concerning the degree of individual control required to “own” a wild animal
persisted throughout English and early American common law. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai.
175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (a majority opinion ruling that physical capture or mortal wounding
was required for possession, and a dissent arguing that pursuit was enough to acquire individual
ownership).
25 J. INST. 2.1.12; see also G. INST. 2.67 (“[W]ild beasts, birds, and fishes, as soon as they are
captured, become, by natural law, the property of the captor, but only continue such so long as
they continue in his power . . . .”).
26 In addition, the property rights gained through capture were defeasible. The natural
freedom of wild animals could be lost to human occupation and then regained by escape. See J.
INST. 2.1.12 (“[O]nce [a wild animal] escapes from your custody and resumes its natural state, it
ceases to be yours and again becomes open to the next taker. It is regarded as reassuming its
natural state when either it disappears from your sight or, though you can still see it, pursuit of
it is difficult.”). Gaius, too, acknowledged that the possibility of escape qualified a capturer’s
property right in an occupied animal. DIG. 41.1.5 (Gaius, Everyday Matters or Golden Words 2).
Occupied animals that wandered off private property or were snatched by persons or other wild
animals remained the property of the original capturer so long as they could be retrieved, or, in
the case of animals like bees, doves, or pigeons, demonstrated the habit of leaving and returning
to captivity. J. INST. 2.1.14 to 2.1.16; DIG. 41.1.5 (Gaius, Everyday Matters or Golden Words 2).
27 See Wise, supra note 19, at 503 (explaining that “the Roman state asserted the power to
regulate (imperium) the exploitation of wild nonhuman animals,” but rarely did so); POUND,
supra note 18, at 111 (observing that the Roman state had sovereign authority to regulate taking
of wildlife); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) (acknowledging that the Roman state
possessed the right to regulate wildlife harvest).
28 See J. INST. 2.1.12 (acknowledging that under Roman law, trespassers acquired title to the
animals they poached).
29 See J. INST. 2.1.12 (“[A]nyone entering another’s land to hunt or for fowling can be
stopped by the owner.”); DIG. 41.1.3 (Gaius, Everyday Matters or Golden Words 2) (“[O]f corse,
a person entering another’s land for the purpose of hunting or fowling can, if the latter becomes
aware of it, lawfully be forbidden entry by the landowner.”).
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B. Capture in Common Law England: Royal Restrictions on the Rule
The rule of capture prevailed throughout common law England.30
However, the authority employed by the English Crown over wild animals
and their habitat produced a different and much more restrictive
permutation of the rule than in Roman law.31 Blackstone wrote that
humanity received from the Creator a “right to pursue and take any fowl or
insect of the air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile
of the field: and this natural right still continues in every individual, [except]
where it is restrained by the civil laws of the country.”32 Under the laws of
England, limitations on wildlife appropriation by private individuals were
pervasive.33
English law did not recognize modern distinctions between proprietary
and sovereign powers. The king not only exercised the lawmaking powers of
a sovereign; as the head of the feudal landholding system, he also
maintained extensive proprietary rights.34 Property owners generally
possessed only those rights granted to them by their superiors in the feudal
hierarchy, and those superiors—most notably the king—could withdraw and
reassign rights under many circumstances.35 Concerning animals ferae
naturae, the king employed his sovereign and proprietary powers to diminish
his subjects’ right to take wildlife by creating an elaborate land-classification
system, including royal forests, and by limiting hunting to royal grantees.

1. Royal Forests
In 1066, William the Conqueror invaded England and declared Norman
rule.36 King William asserted his authority over large swaths of the English
countryside and established a system of royal forests policed by special
courts and administrators, who managed the land and its game for the
benefit of the king and his favored subjects.37 Although the king maintained
30 See Wise, supra note 19, at 516–29 (tracing the law of capture through several centuries
of English history).
31 See George Cameron Coggins, Wildlife and the Constitution: The Walls Come Tumbling
Down, 55 WASH. L. REV. 295, 305 (1980) (recognizing that English capture doctrine was far more
complex and restrictive than the Roman law); David S. Favre, Wildlife Rights: The EverWidening Circle, 9 ENVTL. L. 241, 245 (1979) (“English law first reflected the Roman’s concept of
free access to all animals without state interference but was later modified on behalf of the
Crown to permit the taking of a game animal only with royal permission.”).
32 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *403.
33 See generally Thomas A. Lund, British Wildlife Law Before the American Revolution, 74
MICH. L. REV. 49 (1975) (analyzing British wildlife regulation until the time of the American
Revolution) [hereinafter Lund, British Wildlife Law].
34 See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 203 (recognizing the king’s dual
role as sovereign and head of feudal society); see also Dale D. Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales:
Commons, Capture, Property, and the Public Trust, 35 ENVTL. L. ___, ___ (2005) [hereinafter
Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales] (arguing that “‘sovereignty’—governmental and regulatory
power—generally began as ‘property’ or property-like tenures”).
35 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 203; MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 8 (3d ed. 1997).
36 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 9.
37 For a description of the growth of royal forests under Norman rule, see id. Lund, British
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administrative authority over royal forests, he was not necessarily seized of
all the lands within these designated areas.38 Indeed, a royal forest might
include villages or cultivated fields owned by individuals, in addition to
expanses of timber.39 Within a forest, however, the ability of inholders to
exploit their land was regulated severely to protect certain game species and
their habitat.40 According to John Manwood—author of a sixteenth-century
treatise on England’s forest jurisdiction—the laws of the forest provided that
“no man may cut downe his woods, nor destroy any coverts, within the
Forest, without the view of the Forester, and license of the Lord chiefe
Justice in Eyre of the Forest, although that the soile, wherein those woods
do grow, be a mans owne freehold.”41
The forest laws protected both the “venison”—the forest’s most
valuable game species—and the “vert”—the green plants on which those
species fed.42 Violators of the laws were punished, sometimes severely.
Impermissibly entering or damaging the forest, or illegally planting crops on
designated lands, resulted in monetary fines for the wrongdoer.43 Poaching
food in the forest, meanwhile, was punishable by castration, banishment,
and even death.44 Perhaps because of the occasionally, draconian
punishment, the creation and management of royal forests largely prevented
overharvests of England’s game animals.

2. Hunting Franchises
The expansion of forest jurisdiction was not the only way the English
Crown restricted the taking of wild animals. The king’s authority to create
hunting franchises also narrowed how and when an animal could be reduced
to individual possession. Under Roman law, wild animals were res nullius—
owned by no one.45 In contrast, English courts treated animals as belonging
to the king as an incident of his royal power. In 1592, the King’s Bench

Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 60–61; and GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at
208–09. See also George Cameron Coggins & Deborah Lyndall Smith, The Emerging Law of
Wildlife: A Narrative Bibliography, 6 ENVTL. L. 583, 594 (1976) (“The exclusive right of the
sovereign to hunt in certain areas was such an important prerogative to the Norman kings that
much of farmed Saxon England reverted to forest by royal order.”). As colorfully explained by
Blackstone: “[I]t will be found that all forest and game laws were introduced into Europe at the
same time, and by the same policy, as gave birth to the feudal system; when those swarms of
barbarians issued from their northern hive, and laid the foundation of most of the present
kingdoms of Europe, on the ruins of the western empire.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *413.
For a detailed commentary on England’s forest laws, see JOHN D. MANWOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAWES OF THE FOREST (William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (1598).
38 Dale D. Goble & Eric T. Freyfogle, Wildlife Law: A Coming of Age, 33 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,132, 10,133 (2003) [hereinafter Goble & Freyfogle, A Coming of Age].
39 Id. at 10,133 n.4.
40 Lund, British Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 60–62; GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW,
supra note 4, at 209; BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 9.
41 MANWOOD, supra note 37, at 60.
42 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 208.
43 Id. at 209.
44 See Coggins & Smith, supra note 37, at 594.
45 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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determined, in The Case of the Swans,46 that unmarked swans, as well as
whales and sturgeons, “belong to the King by his prerogative.”47
Later decisions extended the king’s prerogative to include ownership of
all of England’s fisheries48 and all animals ferae naturae.49 England’s most
esteemed legal commentators—Bracton and Blackstone—opined that the
king’s prerogative included ownership of all wildlife within his realm.50 This
idea was strongly contested by Edward Christian, author of an 1817 treatise
on England’s game laws.51 Christian took the position that the king, as
determined by the Case of the Swans, owned only whales, sturgeons, and
swans, while all other wild animals belonged to the owner of the land on
which the animals were found.52
Whether or not the royal prerogative legitimately provided for
ownership of all wildlife, the king claimed the sole right to control the take
of fish and game within England.53 The king not only reserved game and fish
for himself, he asserted exclusive power to grant hunting franchises to his
favored nobility.54 The most extensive hunting franchise was the “chase,”
which provided the grantee an exclusive right to hunt deer, foxes, martins,
and certain other animals on specified land, including land owned by
another.55 A privilege of “park” was more limited, amounting to an “enclosed
chase, extending only over a man’s own grounds.”56 The privilege of
46

(1592) 77 Eng. Rep. 435 (K.B.).

47

Id. at 436. “Prerogative,” a hard-to-define term, generally meant the king’s power over

something simply because he was king. According to Blackstone, “[b]y the word prerogative we
usually understand that special pre-eminence, which the king hath over and above all other
persons, and out of the ordinary course of the common law, in right of his real dignity.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *239.
48 See, e.g., The Case of the Royal Fishery of Banne, (1611) 80 Eng. Rep. 540, 543 (K.B.)
(declaring that every river “is a royal river, and the fishery of it is a royal fishery, and belongs to
the king by his prerogative”).
49 See, e.g., Bowlston v. Hardy, (1597) 78 Eng. Rep. 794, 794 (K.B.) (determining that no
landowner owns unconfined game animals “unless by grant from the King, or by
prescprition . . . for the Queen hath the royalty in such things whereof none can have any
property”).
50 See 1 HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 65 (Sir Travers
Twiss ed., William S. Hein & Co. 1990) (1569) (instructing that wild beasts “now belong to the
king by civil right”); BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *415 (Animals ferae naturae are “bona
vacantia [unclaimed goods], and, having no other owner, belong to the king by his
prerogative.”).
51 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, A TREATISE ON GAME LAWS (1817).
52 Id. at 23–27. See also Lund, British Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 70–71; Goble, Three
Cases / Four Tales, supra note 34, at 34–36 (both contrasting the views of Christian and
Blackstone).
53 See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 9 (observing that the king claimed the sole right
to control wildlife harvest).
54 Professors Goble and Freyfogle refer to the crown’s
ownership right [regarding wildlife as] more than simply a power to regulate private
activities by landowners and hunters. When the creators of English law—be it King,
Parliament, or court—decided who could hunt and where, they were making a positive
allocation of property rather than simply regulating private conduct.
Goble & Freyfogle, A Coming of Age, supra note 38, at 10,133.
55 BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *38.
56 Id.
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“warren” awarded the grantee an exclusive right to take small animals such
as hares, quail, and partridges within a defined area.57 Although there is no
evidence that the king bestowed a right of warren to anyone other than the
landholder, a warren granted in one’s own land was independent of title to
that land, making it possible for the grantee to maintain the franchise even
when the burdened land was transferred.58
Royal franchises did not award the grantee an absolute property right in
the wild animals themselves.59 Instead, they provided the franchise holder an
exclusive right to harvest certain game in designated areas. Royal grantees
held a constructive right in wildlife that served to defeat the competing
claims of a trespassing capturer, or even a landowner. For example, if A
killed a deer in B’s chase, ownership of the deer was in B. Or, if A started
pursuing a hare in B’s warren and chased it onto C’s land, where he killed it,
B still owned the hare.60
Due to grantees’ superior interests in game over landowners, and due to
the royal power over wildlife generally, England’s growing numbers of
landed gentry began to pressure Parliament and the courts to reduce the role
of hunting franchises.61 The shift in power from royal grantees to
landowners was gradual,62 but by the end of the seventeenth century the
stature of royal grants to wildlife withered, replaced by a system favoring
rights associated with land ownership rather than hunting freeholds.63
Among the advances for property owners were the expansion of common
law trespass and the reemergence of the concept of ratione soli, whereby a

57
58

Id. at *38–39.

GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 212; see also Sutton v. Moody, (1693)
91 Eng. Rep. 1063, 1063 (K.B.) (acknowledging that “a man may have a warren in his own land,
and he may alien the land, and retain the privilege of warren”).
59 See, e.g., Blades v. Higgs, (1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1474, 1481 (H.L.) (determining that a royal
grantee’s “qualified or special right of property in game . . . can mean no more than the
exclusive right to catch, kill, and appropriate such animals”); Sutton v. Moody, (1698) 91 Eng.
Rep. 1063, 1063–64 (K.B.) (distinguishing a privilege from actual possession and maintaining
that a warren “gives no greater property in [beasts of warren] to the warrener, for the property
arises to the party from possession”). See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *419 (“[S]uch
persons as may thus lawfully hunt [game pursuant to a royal grant] . . . have (as has been said)
only a qualified property in these animals.”).
Note also the important distinction between killing game, which gives an individual
absolute ownership, and capturing game, which grants only defeasible ownership to the
capturer. See Usher v. Bushnel, (1693) 83 Eng. Rep. 9, 9 (K.B.) (absolute property right in wild
animal obtained only when killed). The English law of wildlife appropriation, like the law of
Rome, allowed captured animals to regain their natural liberty through escape. BLACKSTONE,
supra note 32, at *403; see also supra note 26 (explaining Roman law concerning animals that
escaped capturers).
60 In Sutton at 1064, Lord Holt described in detail the competing property interests in
wildlife held by a landowner, a franchise holder, and a trespassing hunter. The two examples in
the text derive from Holt’s examples.
61 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 211.
62 Michael Bean and Melanie Rowland suggest that the first blow to royal power came with
the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215, which “directed removal of the weirs throughout
England, a directive that was later ‘judicially expanded to bar the king from granting private
fisheries in tidal waters.’” BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 9–10.
63 Id. at 10.
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landowner held constructive possession to all animals on his property.64
Although royal grants to wildlife had not completely disappeared at the time
of the American Revolution, landowners in late eighteenth-century England
were able to exclude capturers—save for those lawfully pursuing vermin—
from taking game on their property.65
Unfortunately for England’s peasantry, the decline of the royal
franchise did not signal any great democratization of the rights to wildlife.
As the king’s power waned, Parliament grabbed it, enacting a series of
statutes prohibiting the taking of game by anyone not “qualified.”66 If an
English citizen did not possess the requisite money or land specified by
these qualification statutes, he was effectively prohibited from hunting, even
on his own land.67 Consequently, despite diminishment of the royal
prerogative, the core of England’s wildlife law on the eve of the American
Revolution remained the complete authority of the English sovereign to
determine what rights others might have to the taking of wildlife.68
England’s policies restricting harvest of wildlife reflected the rule of
capture’s ability to adapt in order to meet the needs of the society employing
it. English game laws were aimed not at species protection or even at
maintaining a sustainable yield of food for its citizenry. Instead, they
promoted feudal ideology.69 By limiting the right to take game to the elite,
the king reaffirmed distinctions in class and societal power and further
endeared himself to the nobility.70 Limits on capture also kept weapons out
of the hands of the peasantry.71 Restricting hunting to royal grantees
64 As recounted by Blackstone, “if a man starts game on another’s private grounds and kill
it there, the property belongs to him in whose ground it was killed, because it was also started
there, the property arising ratione soli.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *419; see also Blades, 11
Eng. Rep. at 1481–82 (determining that ownership of a fatally wounded animal vested in the
landowner by constructive possession, not the trespasser who dealt the lethal blow). Unlike the
possessory interest that a grantee held pursuant to a royal franchise, which continued when an
animal was chased off the land burdened by the franchise, the right that the landowner held
ratione soli vanished when the animal left his land. BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *419.
65 GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 219.
66 “Hunting rights were limited to lay persons who owned lands valued at 40 shillings or
more and clerics who received an annual allowance of at least 10 pounds. Inflation later raised
the required land value to 100 pounds.” Michael E. Field, The Evolution of the Wildlife Taking
Concept from Its Beginning to Its Culmination in the Endangered Species Act, 21 HOUS. L. REV.
457, 462 n.32 (1984) (citing British hunting laws). See also Lund, British Wildlife Law, supra note
33, at 55–60 (examining the qualification statutes and other legislation that regulated wildlife on
the basis of social class).
67 See R v. Chipp, (1726) 93 Eng. Rep. 800, 801 (K.B.) (determining that “the [qualification]
statutes forbid such persons as the defendant to hunt at all” and noting that the fact that the
defendant owned the land was immaterial). This decision serves as another reminder that
hunting rights did not spring from land ownership.
68 BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 10.
69 See Lund, British Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 52–60 (documenting how England’s
game laws secured unequal distribution of the right to use wildlife, thereby promoting
distinctions in class).
70 See id. at 58 (arguing that the king allocated wildlife to nobility “to shore-up their power
and allegiance”); GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 212 (recounting the
discriminatory nature of the qualification statutes).
71 See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 10 (recognizing that English game laws
“perpetuated a pervasive system of class discrimination and at the same time kept weapons out
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discouraged England’s poor from purchasing weapons and narrowed the
opportunities for those who did own guns to sharpen their skills.72 Thus,
English game laws helped insulate England’s established rulers from revolt
by the people that England’s political and social institutions oppressed.73
The social context of feudal England clearly shaped its understanding and
use of the rule of capture.
III. WILDLIFE APPROPRIATION IN EARLY AMERICA
The American colonies, and later the foundling United States,
welcomed the rule of capture with open arms. James Kent wrote, in his
Commentaries on American Law, that occupancy remained “the natural and
original method of acquiring [first title to animals ferae naturae]; and upon
the principles of universal law, that title continues so long as occupancy
continues.”74 Justice Stephen Field similarly embraced a strong rule of
capture as the proper method to obtain possession over wildlife, writing:
The wild bird in the air belongs to no one, but when the fowler brings it to the
earth and takes it into his possession it is his property. He has reduced it to his
control by his own labor, and the law of nature and the law of society recognize
his exclusive right to it. . . . So the trapper on the plains and the hunter in the
north have a property in the furs they have gathered, though the animals from
which they were taken roamed at large and belonged to no one.75

Thus, early American law concerning capture, although based on English
common law, differed greatly from those of England. As described above,
English restrictions on an individual’s right to take wild animals—
specifically the creation of royal forests and granting of hunting franchises—
sought to segregate wildlife for the enjoyment of the king and his nobles, as
well as disarm the peasantry.76 America’s early settlers promptly rejected
their mother country’s legacy of conditioning the right to take game on
wealth and birthright.77 Indeed, they almost had to do so. As Professor Lund
of the hands of those considered unfriendly, or potentially so, to those in power”).
72 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *413 (commenting that the king reserved hunting and
other sporting activities to himself and selected nobility in order to keep the peasantry “in as
low a condition as possible, and especially to prohibit them the use of arms”); Lund, British
Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 55 (observing that the “caste-like overtones of the scheme were
emphasized by enforcement provisions that authorized the qualified to disarm the unqualified”).
73 As Professor Lund observed, “The security of the established rule will therefore be
increased if government supporters are encouraged to hunt and potential dissidents are
prohibited from hunting.” Lund, British Wildlife Law, supra note 33, at 52.
74 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 256 (1st ed., 1826).
75 Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 374 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting).
76 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text.
77 For commentary asserting that early American citizens and courts rejected class-based
restrictions on arms and hunting, see JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILDLIFE?: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 17–18 (1981); Thomas A. Lund,
Early American Wildlife Law, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1976) [hereinafter Lund, Early
American Wildlife Law]; and Coggins, supra note 31, at 305. See also THOMAS A. LUND, AMERICAN
WILDLIFE LAW 23 (1980) [hereinafter LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW] (citing State v. Campell, 1
T.U.P. Charlt. 166, 168 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1808), which rejected a claim to wildlife ownership based
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explained, “In the New World, game was no sporting matter, but rather a
source of food and clothing.”78 But Americans’ decision to deviate from
English policy concerning game regulation was not simply a reactionary
response to England’s feudal history or a choice directed by settlers’
subsistence needs; the geographical and ecological characteristics of the
New World were also influential.
To the common settler, the United States at the dawn of the nineteenth
century was a seemingly endless landmass with an equally infinite wealth of
wildlife and other natural resources.79 And the American populace was
determined to forge a prosperous nation through settling those lands and
exploiting those resources.80 English land-use laws and game regulation
were, however, poor tools for encouraging development, however.81

on English privilege and referring to British forest and game laws as “productive of tyranny”);
id. at 128 (citing Hallock v. Dominy, 7 Hun. 52, 55 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1876), which decried British
hunting franchises as “contrary to the spirit of our institutions”); Johnson v. Patterson, 14 Conn.
1, 5 (1840) (attacking qualification statutes as an “anomaly” in the otherwise admirable British
jurisprudence); New Eng. Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 35 A. 323, 328 (Vt. 1896) (Thompson,
J., dissenting) (condemning “the iniquitous fish and game laws of England, enacted by the ruling
class for their own enjoyment, and which led to a system under which the catching of a fish or
the killing of a rabbit was deemed of more consequence than the happiness, liberty, or life of a
human being”).
78 Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 704. See also Herbert E. Locke,
Right of Access to Great Ponds by the Colonial Ordinance, 12 MAINE L. REV. 148, 150 (1919)
(“[The colonists’] survival and existence demanded the use of every means of obtaining food.”).
79 Wildlife historian William Hornaday, writing in 1913, described the wealth of early
America’s animal population:
“Abundance” is the word with which to describe the original animal life that stocked our
country, and all North America, [in the nineteenth century]. Throughout every state, on
every shore-line, in all the millions of fresh water lakes, ponds and rivers, on every
mountain range, in every forest, and even on every desert, the wild flocks and herds held
sway. It was impossible to go beyond the settled haunts of civilized man and escape
them.
WILLIAM T. HORNADAY, OUR VANISHING WILDLIFE: ITS EXTERMINATION AND PRESERVATION 1 (Arno
Press, Inc. 1970) (1913) (emphasis in original). See also Thomas L. Kimball & Raymond E.
Johnson, The Richness of American Wildlife, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN
UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND ITS CONSERVATION 4, PINPOINT (Howard P.
Brokaw ed., 1978) (commenting that early explorers spoke of the New World as “Eden sprung
from the ocean”); TOBER, supra note 77, at 3–4 (providing several accounts expressing early
settlers’ wonder regarding the variety and abundance of animals in North America).
80 See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 131–32 (1986)
(explaining the importance of settlers’ determination to expand the American West in the
growth of the United States economy); FREDERICK MERK, HISTORY OF THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT
263–64 (1978) (recognizing the role of the Oregon and California trails as “paths of empire” in
America’s formative years, opening channels for settlers to prosper by extracting natural
resources such as gold and timber); ROBERT SOBEL & DAVID B. SICILIA, THE ENTREPRENEURS: AN
AMERICAN ADVENTURE 49–94 (1986) (recounting the fortunes amassed through resource
exploitation in the early American West). See generally ROBERT V. HINE & JOHN MACK FARACHER,
THE AMERICAN WEST: A NEW INTERPRETIVE HISTORY (2000) (discussing the effects of westward
expansion and resource exploitation on developing American culture); JON KUKLA, A
WILDERNESS SO IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND THE DESTINY OF AMERICA (2003)
(recounting American history leading up to the Louisiana Purchase and the effects of suddenly
doubling the size of the young nation).
81 See Field, supra note 66, at 464–65 (“Because of its immense size, its seemingly endless
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England’s own wilderness had vanished long before the discovery of
America, leaving, in Professor Sprankling’s words, “a semipreservationist
property law system attuned to a postwilderness nation.”82 English law
focused on preserving previously established productive uses of land, not on
carving a viable economy from a rugged, virgin land.83 Aware that English
hunting laws were at odds with the basic ideology of their new country,84
American courts and legislators began to formulate a new policy concerning
personal appropriation of wildlife—the “free take” imperative. The rule of
capture was set to evolve once again.

A. The Free Take Imperative
America’s pioneers viewed their country’s wild lands and the animals
that inhabited them with disdain. According to this view, wilderness
impeded progress and slowed the nation’s economic growth.85 In the famous
1805 case of Pierson v. Post,86 which laid down the rule that ownership of
wild animals required physical capture or mortal wounding, the New York
Supreme Court referred to a pursued fox as “a wild and noxious beast,”
“cunning and ruthless,” and a “pirate,” whose death benefited society.87 The
Pierson court’s view concerning animals ferae naturae was typical. To both
American citizens and the judiciary, wilderness and its vast animal life were
hardly cherished resources to be protected, but instead an “enemy to be
conquered and tamed.”88 Settlers firmly believed that wild animals best
served them in the market—as a choice dinner course or tailored into a coat
or hat—rather than roaming the frontier.89 Any policy that restricted hunting
supply of wildlife, and the frontier spirit of its early settlers, the American continent did not
lend itself to the English class system of controlling wildlife.”).
82 John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 524 (1996). See also TOBER, supra note 77, at 5 (observing that the wealth of natural
resources in North America was “striking in comparison to the resources of Europe, which had
been settled for centuries”).
83 See Sprankling, supra note 82, at 525 (“Stability, not innovation, was the heart of English
property law.”); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 31
(1977) (referring to the English view of property as a “static agrarian conception”).
84 See, e.g., LUND, AMERICAN WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 77, at 122 (citing Georgia v.
Campbell, 1 T.U.P. Charlt. 166, 166–67 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1808), which rhetorically asked how
English game laws could apply to “a country which was but one extended forest”).
85 See RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 40 (3d ed. 1982) (“Insofar as
the westward expansion of civilization was thought good, wilderness was bad. It was construed
as much as a barrier to progress, prosperity, and power as it was to godliness.”).
86 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
87 Id. at 180–81 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
88 Thomas A. Campbell, The Public Trust, What’s It Worth?, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 73, 74
(1994). See also Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect

Where the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links and Other Things That Go Bump in the
Night, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 877 (2000) (noting that nineteenth-century courts, “reflecting
commonly held beliefs, viewed wilderness harshly, as an impediment to progress”).
89 See JAMES B. TREFETHEAN, AN AMERICAN CRUSADE FOR WILDLIFE 29 (1975) (“Deer, turkeys
and other products of the chase provided a ready supply of fresh meat until the colonists could
develop their own domesticated flocks and herds. The wild birds and mammals also became an
important source of income. Furs, deer hides, and the down and plume of birds brought high
process in European markets.”); TOBER, supra note 77, at 6 (recognizing that hunting and fishing
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to a specified group or for a limited term would have impeded the harvest of
wildlife, thereby allowing a substantial natural resource to go unused.90
Consequently, the obvious capture rule for America was a rule of free taking,
recognizing everyone’s right to hunt and take game.91 But in order to
effectuate a free take policy, courts and legislatures had several obstacles to
overcome.92 Most prominent among these legal hurdles was the right of
landowners to exclude trespassing hunters.93
In 1829, Justice Joseph Story observed in Van Ness v. Pacard,94 that
“[t]he common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of
America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and
claimed it as their birthright, but they brought with them and adopted only
that portion which was applicable to their situation.”95 Nowhere do Story’s
were vitally important to establishing an early American economy).
90 See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 705 (arguing that limiting
hunting to an elite group would have slowed America’s economic progress); Field, supra note
66, at 465 (claiming that “[t]he sheer press of human numbers on the new continent made
regulated taking impractical”).
91 See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 705 (recognizing “free taking”
as the “logical policy” for America); Favre, supra note 31, at 247 (observing that attempts to
adopt English laws regarding wildlife appropriation were “frustrated by the vastness of the
American continent, and the ‘free taking’ of wildlife ultimately became the acceptable
practice”).
92 See Field, supra note 66, at 465 (“For this free taking concept to prevail, American
lawmakers had to vault several legal hurdles.”).
93 Courts also had to overcome claims of monopoly rights to wildlife based on an express
grant from the English Crown. For example, in Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821),
successors in title to New Jersey’s proprietors claimed that they held an exclusive privilege to
take oysters within that state, based on a grant from the king. Id. at 2–3. The New Jersey
Supreme Court of Judicature, conceding that the king had granted authority over New Jersey’s
submerged lands to certain individuals, determined that unlike proprietary rights that could be
sold for profit, incidents of a sovereign’s prerogative, when transferred, inhered indefeasibly in
the powers of state government. Id. at 49–50. Consequently, the king’s conveyance to the
proprietors conferred on them only the power to govern New Jersey’s submerged lands—and
the oysters found therein—for the benefit of the state’s citizens, not for potential private gain.
Id.
Under the rationale of Arnold and similar cases, royal grants to exclusive hunting or
fishing rights were not sufficient to defeat the interests of the state. As described below, in the
early nineteenth century, state governments did little to shield the game within their borders
from America’s vigorous capture principles. See also Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra
note 77, at 714 (analyzing claims to wildlife based on royal grants and commenting: “Since the
proprietors did not have the power to alienate that which they had received in trust, courts
could find that authority over wildlife remained vested in government despite proprietors’
improvident attempts to sell exclusive rights to private purchasers.”); Field, supra note 66, at
465–66 (“Courts held that express sovereign grants to exclusive hunting rights were distinct
from property rights and as such could not be used for private gain.”). See infra notes 134–36
and accompanying text (explaining Arnold v. Mundy’s role in developing the state ownership
doctrine).
94 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
95 Id. at 144 (Story, J.). Oliver Wendell Holmes conveyed a similar statement in The

Common Law:
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar to the student of history, is this. The
customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive society establish a rule or a formula. In the
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains. The
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set
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words ring more true than in the context of the evolving property law of
early nineteenth-century America. During just a few decades, in an attempt
to meet the new challenges of a frontier nation, American jurists and
legislatures revised England’s common law concerning trespass to land.
These changes elevated wilderness entrepreneurs’ right to take freely wild
game over the landowners’ long-established right to exclude trespassing
capturers.96
On the eve of the American Revolution, English common law granted
landowners a constructive right ratione soli to all wild animals on their
property that was superior to that of a trespasser.97 English landowners also
had the right to exclude all potential capturers except for those lawfully
pursuing noxious vermin.98 As Blackstone expressed it, “[e]very
unwarrantable entry on another’s soil” was a trespass because “every man’s
land is in the eye of the law enclosed and set apart from his neighbour’s . . .
either by a visible and material fence . . . or, by an ideal invisible
boundary.”99 In America, these English rules gave way to a vigorous law of
capture, at least as applied to unenclosed lands.100 Champions of
unrestricted taking argued for and won constitutional protection in some
states for an individual’s right to capture game free of landowner
interference.101 State courts also supported the hunter’s privilege to take
themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. . . . The old form receives a new
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit the [new] meaning which it has
received.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1881). For thorough explanations of the
evolution of the common law of property in early America, see HORWITZ, supra note 83, at 31–
62; LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202–27 (1973); and WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 159–75 (1975).
96 See Babcock, supra note 88, at 877 (“During the nineteenth century, courts made
significant changes in English common law property doctrines . . . . These changes favored the
industrious landowner who altered the landscape, and not the ones who sought to preserve the
status quo. The modified doctrines reflected a hostile attitude toward dormant, wild lands
(wilderness), and the animals that inhabited them . . . .”); Sprankling, supra note 82, at 526
(arguing that “early American courts constructed a new property law system with an inherent
antiwilderness bias. All other things being equal, the reformulated common law of property
tended to resolve use and title disputes in favor of the wilderness exploiter and against the
wilderness nonuser.”).
97 See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text (explaining landowners’ rights concerning
wildlife in common law England).
98 Id. Roman law also maintained that a landowner could prohibit a trespasser from
hunting on his property. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
99 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *209.
100 See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 712 (noting that early American
law often precluded access to developed lands because domestic agriculture was favored over
hunting or fishing).
101 For example, the Vermont Constitution of 1793 provided that “the inhabitants of this
State shall have liberty, in seasonable times, to hunt and fowl on the lands they hold, and on
other lands not inclosed.” VT. CONST. of 1793 ch. 6, § 40, reprinted in 9 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 514 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979). See also PA. CONST. of
1776, art. II, § 43, reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 284
(William F. Swindler ed. 1979) (granting Pennsylvanians the right to hunt on “the lands they
hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed”).
Interestingly, constitutional protection for the right to take wild animals was also debated
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game, even when a landowner requested that the hunter leave.102 But the
most effective method of transforming the English rule of trespass in
America involved the statutory and customary expansion of the doctrine of
implied license.
In an effort to encourage the unrestricted taking of wildlife, some early
American legislatures created a statutory presumption against trespass for
hunters entering unenclosed lands.103 Over time, this presumption grew by
way of “cordial customs between neighbors,” resulting in a de facto rule that
owners who had not posted notice of their opposition welcomed wanderers
onto their wild lands to hunt.104 As explained by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
The strict rule of English common law as to entry upon a close must be taken
to be mitigated by common understanding with regard to the large expanses of
unenclosed and uncultivated land in many parts at least of this country. Over
these it is customary to wander, shoot, and fish at will until the owner sees fit
to prohibit it. A license may be implied from the habits of the country.105

Because posting was costly in wild areas, and owners achieved little
protection from the undertaking, the presumption against trespass
effectively became a “conclusive invitation” for American hunters to take
wildlife on private lands in nineteenth-century America.106

at the national level. Professor Lund noted that, “[t]he minority at the Constitutional Convention
of Pennsylvania argued that the United States Constitution should include a guarantee of the
right to hunt on unenclosed lands.” Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 712
n.76 (citations omitted).
102 See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill.) 244, 244 (S.C. 1818) (rejecting plaintiff’s
trespass claim and determining that “the right to hunt on unenclosed and uncultivated lands has
never been disputed, and it is well known that is has been universally exercised from the first
settlement of the country up to the present time”); Broughton v. Singleton, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott &
McC.) 338, 340 (S.C. 1820) (denying trespass claim and commenting that protecting unenclosed
lands under trespass laws “would overwhelm us in a sea of petty litigation, destructive of the
interests and peace of the community”); Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308, 320 (1855) (determining
that hunting on private land was not trespass, and noting that “drafts upon the forest game, are
also often required to supply the wants of the pioneer, under the contingencies and
inconveniences of a sparsely inhabited country.”).
103 PA. ACTS ch. XXIV (1749), reprinted in Evans Microprint No. 8706 (requiring landowner
permission to enter and hunt on enclosed lands, thereby implying that such permission was not
required for open lands); 1 HENING’S STAT. AT LARGE 437, act XIII (Va. 1657–58) (requiring
permission to hunt on planted or enclosed lands, but not on open, privately-owned land). See
also Babcock, supra note 88, at 883 (recognizing that early trespass laws fostered “the legal
presumption that landowners welcomed hunters and fishers, and withheld from landowners the
most basic of the prerequisites of ownership, the right to exclude.”); Field, supra note 66, at 465
(“Lawmakers skirted the law of trespass by opening undeveloped private lands to wildlife
takers, allowing egress across private lands to lakes, and establishing presumptions that
landowners welcomed hunters and fishermen.”).
104 See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 713 (noting that early colonial
landowners “who had not post notices of their opposition welcomed wanderers to hunt on their
wild lands”).
105 McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922).
106 Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 714.
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B. The Consequences of a Pure Rule of Capture
By awarding the first taker the exclusive rights to the resource, an
unrestricted rule of capture encouraged resource exploitation. When first in
right became first in time, speed and efficiency of capture became
paramount. The classic American illustration was the California gold rush of
the 1840s and ‘50s.107 A less familiar example was the destruction of wild
fowl and big game species by nineteenth-century market hunters. By
rewarding efficient capture, America’s freewheeling wildlife harvest policies
promoted investment in capture technology, encouraging hunters to
purchase bigger nets, better guns, and more ammunition.108 Moreover,
because taking game in moderation meant compromising revenue, market
hunters often reduced populations to below carrying capacity.109 Nineteenthcentury state legislatures, viewing nature as inexhaustibly bountiful,110
allowed this unrestricted harvest by failing to regulate the taking of
wildlife.111
The fate of the passenger pigeon vividly illustrates how early nonregulation of market hunting played out. At the time of America’s discovery,
passenger pigeons ranged from the Atlantic Coast westward to the Rocky
Mountains; their numbers were estimated in the billions.112 The species was
107 See generally H.W. BRANDS, THE AGE OF GOLD: THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND THE NEW
AMERICAN DREAM (2003); MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, DAYS OF GOLD: THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH
AND THE AMERICAN NATION (1997). See also Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales, supra note 34, at 11–
20 (describing nineteenth-century American resource rushes for timber, gold, and animal pelts).
108 See TOBER, supra note 77, at 74–75 (describing development of new types of weapons by
market hunters).
109 See Coggins & Smith, supra note 37, at 595 (observing that “the democratic spirit as
applied to hunting was eventually disastrous to the sport itself . . . the anti-regulation mentality
in early nineteenth-century America was responsible for the extinction of many species, and the
severe depletion of the populations of many more”); see also TOBER, supra note 77, at 35 n.6
(listing several species exterminated by market hunting); HORNADAY, supra note 79 (chronicling,
at the turn of the twentieth century, all extinct species and species threatened by extinction).
110 For example, a select committee of the Ohio Senate made these negative comments
concerning legislation proposed to protect the passenger pigeon in 1857:

The passenger pigeon needs no protection. Wonderfully prolific, having the vast forests
of the North as its breeding grounds, traveling hundreds of miles in search of food, it is
here today and elsewhere tomorrow, and no ordinary destruction can lessen them.

Quoted in F. Wayne King, The Wildlife Trade, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA: CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN
UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND ITS CONSERVATION 254 (Howard P. Brokaw ed.,
1978) (citations omitted).
111 As explained by Professors Goble and Freyfogle, under nineteenth-century game laws,
“[b]ison could be slaughtered for their tongues and left to rot; passenger pigeons could be left
where they fell when picking them up became too onerous.” GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW,
supra note 4, at 125.
112 Although a definitive count will never be confirmed, scientific studies estimate the
population of passenger pigeons at the time of the discovery of America at three billion, with a
possibility of as many as five trillion. A.W. SCHORGER, THE PASSENGER PIGEON: ITS NATURAL
HISTORY AND EXTINCTION 204 (1973). Other studies suggest that passenger pigeons historically
formed 25–40% of the total bird population in North America. Id. at 205.
In his novel, The Pioneers, James Fenimore Cooper vividly described the throngs of passenger
pigeons that American settlers encountered during their early westward advances: “Here is a
flock that the eye cannot see the end of. There is food enough in it to keep the army of Xeres for
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so abundant that it became a chief staple in metropolitan meat markets.113
Passenger pigeons were most often caught en masse by large spring-loaded
nets,114 but sometimes they were shot for the market.115 The number of birds
that could be caught in a single day by an expert netter was staggering: “A
fair average is sixty to ninety dozen birds per day per net . . . . A double net
has been known to catch 2,500 birds per day.”116 Although hunters exploited
passenger pigeons throughout the eastern states, the greatest slaughter
occurred in Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.117 In one forty-day period in
1869, nearly twelve million pigeons were sent to market from Hartford,
Michigan.118 Another Michigan town marketed over fifteen million pigeons in
a two-year span.119
By the mid-1800s, this excessive hunting resulted in a marked reduction
of passenger pigeons.120 But most Americans refused to believe that the once
bountiful species was in danger of extinction.121 Instead, people commonly
believed that the birds had taken refuge in South America or Mexico, or had
simply “gone out to sea.”122 To early twentieth-century wildlife observer
William Hornaday, however, it was clear what had happened to the vast
numbers of passenger pigeons: “They went down and out by systematic,
wholesale slaughter for the market and the pot, before the shotguns, clubs,
and nets of the earliest American pot-hunters. Wherever [passenger pigeons]
nested, they were slaughtered.”123 A victim of America’s pro-capture

a month, and feathers enough to make beds for the whole country.” JAMES FENIMORE COOPER,
THE PIONEERS, OR, THE SOURCES OF SUSQUEHANNA: A DESCRIPTIVE TALE 250 (1896).
113 See generally H.B. Roney, Efforts to Check the Slaughter, AMERICAN FIELD, Jan. 11, 1879,
reprinted in THE PASSENGER PIGEON 81 (W.B. Mershon ed., 1907) (detailing the prices of
passenger pigeons in city markets and fashionable restaurants); W.B. MERSHON, THE PASSENGER
PIGEON 105–18 (1907) (describing the decline of the pigeon market).
114 Hunters would clear a marshy area of all grass and debris, bait the ground with salt, and
allow a flock of birds to congregate. When a sufficient number of birds occupied the baited
area, the hunters ensnared the entire flock with a large—typically six feet wide by thirty feet
long—spring-loaded net. Roney, supra note 113, at 77.
115 Dr. Schorger observed that when “firing from the proper angle, a hunter could kill eight
or ten [passenger pigeons] at a shot.” SCHORGER, supra note 112, at 187. In fact, passenger
pigeons were so easily shot, many nineteenth-century hunters refused to label it a “game” bird.
Id. at 186.
116 Roney, supra note 113, at 80–81.
117 HORNADAY, supra note 79, at 13.
118 Sullivan Cook, What Became of the Pigeon?, FOREST AND STREAM, Mar. 14, 1903, reprinted
in THE PASSENGER PIGEON 171 (W.B. Mershon ed., 1907).
119 Id.; see also Chief Pokagon, The Wild Pigeon of North America, 22 THE CHATAUQUAN No.
20, Nov. 1895, reprinted in THE PASSENGER PIGEON 54–55 (W.B. MERSHON ED., 1907) (estimating
that not less than 300 tons of pigeons were shipped from Michigan in 1878). The pioneer
American ornithologist Alexander Wilson described the scene: “Wagon loads of them are
poured into market, where they sell from fifty to twenty-five and even twelve cents per dozen.”
ALEXANDER WILSON, AMERICAN ORNITHOLOGY 206 (1814).
120 King, supra note 110, at 253–54.
121 In fact, in 1848—a date by which eastern states knew the populations of pigeons were
dwindling—Massachusetts passed a bill protecting netters of passenger pigeons from outside
interference. Under this law, any individual that damaged a hunter’s nets or frightened pigeons
away from their pursuer was subject to a $10 fine. HORNADAY, supra note 79, at 13.
122
123

Id.
Id. at 11.
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mindset, the last wild passenger pigeon was shot in September of 1908, and
the last captive bird died in a Cincinnati zoo on September 1, 1914.124
Passenger pigeons were not the only species affected by the country’s
unrestricted rule of capture; many populations of North American fowl
disappeared before the guns of commercial hunters. Extinction of the Great
Auk—a sea-going diving bird about the size of a domestic goose—occurred
by 1844,125 and the Labrador Duck was wiped out around 1875, “before the
scientific world even knew its existence was threatened.”126 Mammal
populations, too, dwindled during this time period, especially big game
species like deer, elk, bighorn sheep, and bison.127 By the late 1800s, it was
evident that trade in wild meats and wildlife products had to be brought
under control.128 A radical change in American laws concerning animals
ferae naturae was on the horizon. This change would see the free take
principle soon dislodged by states’ claims to superior rights to wildlife in
trust for their citizens.
IV. THE RISE OF STATE OWNERSHIP OF WILDLIFE: LIMITING CAPTURE VIA PUBLIC
TRUST PRINCIPLES
The vigorous capture rules fostered by early America’s pioneer spirit
resulted in the extinction of many species in the New World and the
depletion of populations of many more. State legislators sought to maintain
a sustainable food supply for their citizens,129 but their power to curb the
rule of capture remained questionable. To ensure that capturers did not
exploit North American wildlife to extinction, several state courts upheld
legislation to stop overharvesting by looking to English law. Although
American courts rejected the English class-based restrictions on arms and
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King, supra note 110, at 254.
Kimball & Johnson, supra note 79, at 10.
126 HORNADAY, supra note 79, at 11.
127 For general commentary on the decline of North America’s big game species due to
commercial hunting, see TREFETHEAN, supra note 89; and PETER MATTHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN
AMERICA (1959). For in-depth discussions on the destruction of bison in the western United
States, see E. DOUGLAS BRANCH, THE HUNTING OF THE BUFFALO 148–84 (1929); and TOM MCHUGH,
THE TIME OF THE BUFFALO 271–90 (1972).
128 Susan Morath Horner, Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in
Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 37 (2000) (commenting that “[i]t was not until the late
Nineteenth Century, when the full impacts of the Industrial Revolution on our natural resources
were beginning to be felt, that the questions of property rights in animals began to have a
substantially different form in our jurisprudence”).
The first stirrings of opposition to unrestricted wildlife taking came from nineteenthcentury intellectual luminaries such as Henry David Thoreau—in Walden (1854)—and Ralph
Waldo Emerson—in Nature (1836)—as well as sportsmen, who believed that without
regulation, market hunters would severely infringe on sport hunting. In 1844, 80 influential
sportsmen founded America’s first conservation-oriented group, the New York Sportsman’s
Club. Several similar groups followed in the ensuing years, culminating with the formation of
the Sierra Club (1892) and Audubon Society (1905). Favre, supra note 31, at 250.
129 Professor Coggins has observed that early state wildlife regulation “was directed at [the]
preservation of a food source; neither recreational, ethical, nor aesthetic values were prominent
in legislation until well into [the twentieth] century.” Coggins, supra note 31, at 305.
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hunting,130 they did not erase all remnants of the king’s sovereign
prerogative. Instead, American courts transformed the English concept of
prerogative ownership and fashioned a uniquely American justification for
regulation: the state “ownership” doctrine, also known as the wildlife
trust.131 Professor Goble has aptly referred to this transition as
“republicanizing” the royal prerogative.1132 By the late 1800s, many states had
employed a sovereign ownership theory to regulate the use of fishing
grounds, restrict hunting by seasons or outright prohibitions, and terminate
certain commerce in wildlife altogether.133

A. The Foundation of the American Wildlife Trust
The foundation for nineteenth-century wildlife regulation was laid by
several state and U.S. Supreme Court decisions supporting state ownership
of public resources in trust for all citizens. Development of an American
public trust doctrine began with the 1821 New Jersey Supreme Court
decision Arnold v. Mundy.134 In Arnold, Chief Justice Kilpatrick ruled that
under English common law, New Jersey’s navigable waters and the lands
submerged beneath them were “common to all the citizens, and . . . the
property is . . . vested in the sovereign . . . not for his own use, but for the use
of the citizens.”135 The court explained that this ownership interest, once the
English king’s prerogative, transferred to New Jersey as a result of the
revolution and provided the state inherent authority to regulate the resource
for the benefit of its citizenry.136
Although recent scholarship has questioned Justice Kilpatrick’s
interpretation of English precedent,137 the Supreme Court adopted the New

130

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

131

The Washington Supreme Court explained the transfer of the crown’s wildlife
prerogative to the several states in the 1914 case of Cawsey v. Brickey:
Under the common law of England all property right in animals ferae naturae was in the
sovereign for the use and benefit of the people. The killing, taking, and use of game was
subject to absolute governmental control for the common good. This absolute power to
control and regulate was vested in the colonial governments as a part of the common
law. It passed with the title to game to the several states as an incident of their
sovereignty, and was retained by the states for the use and benefit of the people of the
states, subject only to any applicable provisions of the federal Constitution.
Cawsey v. Brickey, 144 P. 938, 939 (Wash. 1914).
132 2 Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales, supra note 34, at 36–40.
133 See, e.g., TOBER, supra note 77, at 139–77 (providing a broad history of game laws in
nineteenth-century America); GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 762–68
(analyzing early American regulation of the taking of wildlife); HORNADAY, supra note 79, at 265–
303 (presenting a state-by-state status report on wildlife legislation just after the turn of the
twentieth century).
134 6 N.J.L. 1 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821). See Goble, Three Cases / Four Tales, supra note 34, at 36–
40 (providing analysis on the Arnold v. Mundy decision).
135 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 52 (Kilpatrick, C.J.).
136 Id. at 53.
137 See, e.g., Michael J. Bean, Federal Wildlife Law, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND ITS CONSERVATION 280
(Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978) (noting that Arnold and its progeny are noteworthy because they
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Jersey approach in the 1842 case of Martin v. Waddell.138 Citing no
discernable authority, Chief Justice Roger Taney declared in Martin that
under English common law the “dominion and property in navigable waters,
and in the lands under them, [were] held by the king as a public trust.”139 The
Court proceeded to hold that “when the Revolution took place, the people of
each state became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their
own common use.”140 Arnold and Martin became the cornerstones of the
gave birth to the public trust doctrine, “which apparently had not even existed in England . . . at
the time of the American Revolution”); Anna R.C. Caspersen, The Public Trust Doctrine and the
Impossibility of “Takings” by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 357, 367 (1996) (explaining
that Arnold v. Mundy “extended the public trust doctrine further than the English courts, which
had been limited by the fact that ownership was vested in the King rather than in the people”);
Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical
Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FL. ST. U. L.
REV. 513, 590 (1975) (arguing that “at the time the public trust doctrine was supposedly vesting
the Crown title to submerged beds and the foreshore in the newly sovereign American states,
there was virtually no support for such a doctrine in English common law”; rather, under
English common law “the beds and shores of virtually all navigable waters, tidal and nontidal,
were privately owned”). But see Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign’s Ancient
Prerogative Becomes the People’s Environmental Right, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195, 200 (1980)
(arguing that although the Arnold court’s research has been criticized, the public trust doctrine
“has taken firm root in this country and is not likely to be dislodged”).
Commenting on a draft of this article, Eric Freyfogle wrote:
[Y]ou question the judicial precedent for the public trust doctrine. This is fair enough,
but it seems to me that the rise of the public trust cannot be separated from the demise
of the crown and thus the need to divide up the various powers that the crown
possessed. In my rather simplistic understanding of it, it seems that lawmakers in
America necessarily had to decide what the king owned personally and what property he
held in a sovereign capacity (since the king’s counselors largely used the term property
to cover everything). That was the issue in Arnold, of course. In England, the general
practice was the navigable waterways were owned by the king in a sovereign capacity
(though the term was not used) which meant, critically, that the public had rights to fish.
(This, after all, was what it all came down to.) If the king had owned the waterways in a
proprietary capacity, then the public would not have had rights to fish. One further
missing piece: did the king have the right to transfer navigable waterways into private
hands, thereby ending the public’s rights? No clear answer, I think—or rather there were
two answers, yes and no. The king did this, of course, but it was ardently resisted and his
power to do it denied. This was where things stood when U.S. judges enter the picture,
and they had to translate all this into a legal system without a king. Their sensible answer
was to say that the state owned the waterways (they were held by the king as sovereign,
not as proprietor) and the sovereign had only limited powers to alienate the waterways
(hence the public trust doctrine). This was very much in keeping with a major strand of
English legal writing—the strand written by those who opposed the king and sought to
resist his power, which is to say the Whiggish strand of writing that most appealed to
American revolutionaries. My bottom line is that the public trust doctrine did build upon
a solid body of English legal materials; the only thing new was the phrasing of the idea.
E-mail from Eric Freyfogle, Max L. Rowe Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law,
to Michael C. Blumm, Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School (Oct. 12, 2005).
138 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
139 Id. at 411.
140 Id. at 410. While the reasoning of Martin v. Waddell applied only to the thirteen original
colonies, in Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845), the Supreme Court extended the
same principle to all subsequently admitted states under the equal footing doctrine. See BEAN &
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public trust in navigable waters and submerged lands, and they also figured
prominently in the evolution of another line of cases concluding that public
trust principles extended beyond the beds and banks of navigable
waterways to wildlife.141
In 1855, in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that Maryland’s
proprietary interest in submerged lands conferred upon the state the
authority to regulate the taking of oysters embedded within its tidelands.142
As explained by Justice Curtis: “This power results from the ownership of
the soil, from the legislative jurisdiction of the State over it, and from the
duty to preserve unimpaired those public uses for which the soil is held.”143
Also in 1855, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a statute
prohibiting the use of purse seines within a mile of the Nantucket shore,
declaring that swimming fish, as well as shellfish, belonged to the state in
trust for its citizens.144 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the 1891 case of
Manchester v. Massachusetts,145 validated a Massachusetts regulation
restricting the lawful methods for catching menhaden—a bait fish that
served as the primary food source for larger, commercially valuable fish—
under the theory that the state had a proprietary interest in all fish within the
state’s inland and coastal waters.146 Following English common law, which
treated fish the same as terrestrial animals,147 the public trust doctrine
announced by the Supreme Court in Martin and broadened in Smith and
Manchester eventually became amphibious, ultimately extending to all
animals ferae naturae.

B. Early Wildlife Cases: Correcting the Market Hunting Problem
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, state legislatures began to
regulate wildlife taking in order to preserve a food supply decimated by
market hunters.148 The earliest regulations imposed bag limits and shortened
or closed hunting seasons in an attempt to prevent excessive slaughter of

ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 12 n.16 (commenting on the equal footing doctrine).
141 For analyses noting the importance of Arnold and Martin in the development of the
wildlife trust, see Coggins, supra note 31, at 305; Goble & Freyfogle, A Coming of Age, supra
note 38, at 10,135; Caspersen, supra note 137, at 366–67; Bean, supra note 137, at 280; and
Horner, supra note 128, at 38.
142 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 75 (1855). In 1876, the Court reached a similar result, employing a
public trust rationale to uphold a Virginia statute forbidding citizens of other states from
planting oysters in Virginia tidewaters. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 397 (1876).
143 Smith, 59 U.S. at 76.
144 Dunham v. Lamphere, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 268 (1855).
145 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
146 Id. at 266. The Court observed that preservation of menhaden benefited the public
because the fish served as “food for other fish which are so used . . . for the common benefit.”
Id. at 265. Michael Bean and Melanie Rowland commented that the quoted language is
significant because it “reflects a fundamental nineteenth-century conception of the purpose of
wildlife law, the preservation of a food supply.” BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 13.
147 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 32, at *392 (explaining that the capture laws pertaining to
fish apply equally to terrestrial game species such as deer and rabbits).
148 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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fowl and other game.149 Although market hunters challenged limits that
restricted their right to capture wildlife, courts routinely upheld the laws
using public trust principles. Just as the king owned all wildlife at common
law,150 so the states, by the transfer of royal authority, maintained a
proprietary interest in the wild animals within their borders, which provided
them authority to limit the taking of game.151 As explained by the Supreme
Court of Illinois in 1881:
The ownership being in the people of the State—the repository of the sovereign
authority—and no individual having any property rights to be affected, it
necessarily results that the legislature, as the representative of the people of the
State, may withhold or grant to individuals the right to hunt and kill game, or
qualify and restrict it, as, in the opinion of its members, will best serve the
public welfare.152

Despite such judicial endorsements of state ownership of wildlife,
enforcement of early taking restrictions proved difficult because hunters
could easily discard, conceal, or consume animals taken in violation of
law.153 Recognizing the inadequacy of temporal restrictions and bag limits,
states increasingly began to use marketing laws to impose workable
restrictions on taking. As Professor Lund observed, “By identifying the
criminal act as the sale rather than the taking, the offense could be moved
out of the wilderness and into the marketplace, where controls could be
effectively enforced.”154
Nineteenth-century courts employed state ownership of animals ferae
naturae to justify limiting the taking of wildlife because the enactment of
market restrictions occurred at a time when courts held a narrow view of
the scope of the state police power.155 In the late nineteenth and early
149 For example, by 1878, Massachusetts imposed bag limits on oysters, eels, and certain
game birds. See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 724 n.164. Similarly, an
1872 Maryland law prohibited the use of cannon-like punt and swivel guns and restricted the
hunting of waterfowl to the daylight hours of Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. See TOBER,
supra note 77, at 141. See also id. at 140–44 (providing more examples of American game laws
in the 1870s).
150 See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
151 See Coggins & Smith, supra note 37, at 595 n.19 (observing that the king’s prerogative
was “transferred, at first only in theory, and later in fact, to the sovereign people as a whole in
the person or entity of the state. Eventually it came to be accepted that ‘title’ to wildlife rested
in the state in trust, more or less, for the people.”).
152 Magner v. Illinois, 97 Ill. 320, 333–34 (1881).
153 Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 724. See also FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA,
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 73 (1962) (“Distances were too great, the time
lag too long, and the difficulties of arranging for witnesses too serious to provide an effective
deterrent or remedy for [the problems associated with market hunting].”).
154 See Lund, Early American Wildlife Law, supra note 77, at 724. See also TOBER, supra note
77, at 150 (explaining that nineteenth-century game laws were considerably easier to enforce in
the marketplace than in the field).
155 See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 387 (suggesting that late
nineteenth-century marketing limits may have been hard to uphold under a police power
analysis); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 665 (1986) (“The trust
doctrine arose at a time . . . when sovereign power depended on ownership . . . and courts
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twentieth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose significant limits on state
economic regulation.156 During this era, the Court basically elevated freedom
of contract to a fundamental right with which the state could interfere only
to control significant public health, safety, or moral problems.157
State game laws completely withholding the right to sell certain species
may have foundered under this turn-of-the-century judicial view of the police
power.158 To avoid due process-imposed limits on economic regulation,
courts viewed marketing laws not as a regulation enforced on a hunter’s
property after capture, but instead as a restriction on the property right the
hunter could obtain in wild animals in the first instance.159 As owner of all
ferae naturae within its borders, the state had the power to determine which
rights were included in the private ownership of wildlife. The state
ownership doctrine thus enabled courts to avoid difficult inquiries into the
limits of the state’s sovereign authority to regulate trade in wild animals.
Legislation restricting the possession and sale of wildlife and wildlife
products within particular states dramatically reduced hunters’ exploitation
of certain game, especially fowl.160 Often, however, if a state set rigorous
interpreted the scope of governmental police powers quite narrowly.”).
156 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 587–96 (2d ed.
2002) (documenting the Supreme Court’s embrace of economic substantive due process from
1870 through 1937).
157 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (declaring unconstitutional a New
York law that set the maximum hours a baker could work, and articulating that liberty under
the Fourteenth Amendment includes the “general right to make a contract in relation to [a
person’s] business”), overruled by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (upholding
as constitutional a state law prohibiting the sale of alcohol under a police power analysis, but
strongly indicating that similar laws would be invalidated as violating due process if they did
not have a “real or substantial relation” to the purpose of protecting public morals).
158 While some late nineteenth-century courts employed the police power as authority to
regulate possession and sale of wildlife, most—perhaps all—of these courts blended language
regarding sovereignty and property. For example, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld a law
prohibiting possession and sale of certain game because “the regulation is one which
reasonably tends to prevent the taking or killing of game in the closed or forbidden season, and
is therefore a legitimate exercise of the police power.” State v. Rodman, 59 N.W. 1098, 1099
(Minn. 1894). The court then went on to endorse the ownership theory of regulation, stating:
“We take it to be the correct doctrine in this country that the ownership of wild animals, so far
as they are capable of ownership, is in the state, not as a proprietor, but in its sovereign
capacity, as the representative and for the benefit of all its people in common.” Id. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of California endorsed a statute limiting the sale of deer meat because the act
was “not in excess of the police power,” but then noted that “[t]he wild game within [California]
belongs to the people in their collective sovereign capacity. It is not the subject of private
ownership except in so far as the people may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit,
absolutely prohibit the taking of it, or any traffic or commerce in it, if deemed necessary for its
protection or preservation, or the public good.” Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894).
159 See, e.g., Rodman, 59 N.W. at 1099 (ruling that restrictions on the sale of game “deprive
no person of his property, because he who takes or kills game had no previous right or property
in it, and, when he acquires such a right by reducing it to possession, he does so subject to such
conditions and limitations as the legislature has seen fit to impose”).
160 Professors Goble and Freyfogle maintain that marketing laws, which limited and often
prohibited the right to sell certain game species within a state, “benefit[ted] wildlife as much or
more than any other legal act.” GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 387.
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restrictions on selling game species, market hunters would simply poach
game in the regulated state and transport the carcasses into a neighboring,
less-regulated state for sale.161 This development was encouraged by the new
technology of efficient cold storage in the 1870s and 1880s, allowing eastern
markets to be regularly supplied animals taken in the West.162 Some cities,
like Boston and Washington, D.C.—because of their extended sale periods—
became known as “dumping grounds” for game killed in other states.163 The
Massachusetts Fish and Game Protective Association estimated in 1896 that
ninety to ninety-five percent of the game sold in Boston originated outside
Massachusetts.164 To close such loopholes, states began to enact legislation
prohibiting the shipment of game out-of-state, even where the game had
been lawfully harvested.165 Hunters resisted the new regulations, filing suits
in which they argued that these protectionist laws violated the federal
Commerce Clause prohibition against disrupting interstate commerce.166

C. Geer v. Connecticut: The Polestar of the State Ownership Doctrine
In 1896, in Geer v. Connecticut,167 in what became a landmark opinion,
the Supreme Court addressed the wildlife ownership theory that had
developed in state courts over the previous two decades. At issue in Geer
was whether the state of Connecticut could forbid game that had been
lawfully taken within the state from being transported out-of-state for sale
without violating the Commerce Clause.168 Before the Court addressed the
constitutional issue, however, Justice Edward White embarked on a
161

King, supra note 110, at 254.
TOBER, supra note 77, at 199.
163 Id. at 238 n.84.
164 Id. A similar claim was made for the New York City market in 1885. Id.
165 See id. at 156 (observing that, by 1901, all but five states prohibited the export of at least
one species, and many states prohibited the sale and/or export of a wide range of legally
captured animals). Some states also prohibited the import of game legally acquired elsewhere,
so that the inflow of game taken outside the state did not provide a cover under which local
hunting might continue. See State v. Randolph, 1 Mo. Ct. App. 15, 17 (1876) (upholding the
application of a law prohibiting the possession and sale of imported game, and stating: “The
game law would be nugatory if, during the prohibited season, game could be imported from the
neighboring States.”); Roth v. State, 37 N.E. 259, 260 (Ohio 1894) (upholding a statute preventing
import of fowl because the statute offered more protection to “birds and game in this state than
one preventing the sale of such only as should be killed here”).
166 See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. People, 24 N.E. 758 (Ill. 1890) (upholding an Illinois statute
that prohibited all transport of game killed in state for subsequent sale out-of-state); Organ v.
State, 19 S.W. 840 (Ark. 1892) (upholding the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute prohibiting
the exportation of fish and game from the state).
167 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
168 The Commerce Clause provides: “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. No constitutional provision expressly declares that states may not burden
interstate commerce, but the Supreme Court has inferred this prohibition from the express
grant of federal power, in Article I, section 8, to regulate commerce among the states. As
explained by Felix Frankfurter, “[T]he doctrine [is] that the commerce clause, by its own force
and without national legislation, puts it into the power of the Court to place limits on state
authority.” FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE 18
(1937).
162
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thorough examination of the nature of the property right in wildlife and the
states’ authority over it.169
Justice White first embraced the traditional rule of capture, noting that
under natural law, any person could reduce wildlife to individual possession
through the method of occupation.170 But he was quick to note that an
individual’s right to acquire wild animals had always been subject to
governmental regulation: “From the earliest traditions, the right to reduce
animals ferae naturae to possession has been subject to the control of the
law-giving power.”171 Drawing heavily on the Court’s earlier decisions
recognizing a public trust in fish and shellfish,172 Justice White described
how this venerable tradition of regulating the taking of wildlife had been
incorporated into American law:
Whilst the fundamental principles upon which the common property in game
rests have undergone no change, the development of free institutions has led to
the recognition of the fact that the power or control lodged in the State,
resulting from the common ownership [of wild animals], is to be exercised . . .
as a trust for the benefit of the people and not as a prerogative for the
advantage of the government.173

After explicitly adopting the theory that states own all wildlife in trust
for their citizens, the Court described the state’s responsibilities in managing
the trust corpus: “[O]wnership of the sovereign authority [in wildlife] is in
trust for all the people of the state; and hence, by implication, it is the duty
of the legislature to enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the
trust, and secure its beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.”174
This rationale led the Court to conclude that the state, as part of its
ownership, had the authority—perhaps even an obligation—to impose
limitations on the property interests individuals could acquire in wildlife to
benefit the citizens of the state.175 The Court thus upheld the challenged
statute, concluding that Connecticut could exclude game birds from
interstate commerce, even while permitting them to lawfully remain in
commerce within the state, because its export restriction preserved “a
valuable food supply” for the state’s owners-in-common.176
169 Geer, 161 U.S. at 522–30. The Court cut a broad swath, tracing the development of
property rights in wildlife from Athenian and Roman law through French civil law and English
common law to American colonial and state law. Id.
170 Id. at 523.
171 Id. at 522.
172 Justice White cited both McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (oysters) and
Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (menhaden) for the proposition that states
have the authority to control and regulate game in a proprietary fashion. Id. at 528. See supra
notes 142–147 and accompanying text (discussing McCready and Manchester in the context of
developing a public trust in wildlife).
173 Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.
174 Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
175 Id. at 530–34.
176 Id. at 534. The Court raised, without deciding, the issue of whether “commerce” was in
fact created by the killing and sale of wildlife within a state:

[I]t may well be doubted whether commerce is created by an authority given by a state to
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Although the Geer majority made clear that a state’s power over wild
animals extended only “in so far as its exercise may not be incompatible
with, or restrained by, the rights conveyed to the federal government by the
Constitution,”177 in the years following the decision, states’ rights advocates
routinely ignored this limiting language, adopting Geer’s most expansive
interpretation and maintaining that, as owners of wildlife, states were
entirely beyond the reach of federal authority. Indeed, many states employed
Geer to argue that their proprietary interest in animals ferae naturae
preempted both federal legislation and the limitations imposed by the U.S.
Constitution.178 In response to these state attempts to erect Geer and its
state ownership rationale as a barrier to federal legislation and regulations
aimed at preventing species decline, the Supreme Court slowly narrowed
Geer’s holding, eventually overruling state ownership of wildlife as violative
of the Commerce Clause in Hughes v. Oklahoma in 1979.179
V. GEER IS DEAD: OR SO IT SEEMED
After the Supreme Court decided Geer in 1896, the Court invoked the
theory of state ownership of wildlife to uphold state game regulations in a
variety of circumstances.180 But it never endorsed state ownership as
providing exclusive and unlimited state regulatory authority over wildlife. To
the contrary, the Court progressively weakened the state ownership

reduce game within its borders to possession, provided such game be not taken, when
killed, without the jurisdiction of the state. . . . The qualification which forbids its
removal from the state necessarily entered into and formed part of every transaction on
the subject, and deprived the mere sale or exchange of these articles of that element of
freedom of contract and of full ownership which is an essential attribute of commerce.

Id. at 530. In a prescient dissent, Justice Field rejected the ownership rationale, arguing that
wild game was not actually the property of the state, and that since a lawfully killed animal
“becomes an article of commerce, its use cannot be limited to the citizens of one State to the
exclusion of citizens of another State.” Id. at 538 (Field, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 528.
178 See, e.g., Coggins, supra note 31, at 306 (asserting that Geer “gave rise to the widespread,
frequently ardent belief that because a state owned its resident wildlife, its actions with respect
to its property were subject to no constraints, not even constitutional restrictions”); Mary
Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying Principles of
Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 60 (2000) (noting that
after Geer “states attempted to argue that, as a result of their property-based interest in wildlife,
they could properly condition the taking of wildlife within their borders” without having to
comply with federal legislation or the Constitution); BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 15
(commenting that Geer allowed some to argue that the state ownership doctrine “render[ed]
impossible the development of a body of federal wildlife law”).
179 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
180 See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (state hunting regulations held
constitutional as applied to Indians on reservation despite claim of preemption by federal
treaty); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914) (state prohibition against hunting by
resident aliens upheld over due process and equal protection challenges); Lacoste v. Dep’t of
Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924) (state severance tax on skins taken from wild animals upheld
under commerce clause attack); Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)
(upholding higher non-resident license fees for hunting elk against privileges and immunities
and equal protection attacks).
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rationale announced by Geer until it finally overruled Geer in 1979.181 The
analysis below recounts the apparent demise of the state ownership doctrine
through two parallel lines of cases: one focusing on the federal power to
regulate animals ferae naturae, and the other considering the U.S.
Constitution as a restriction on state game regulation.182

A. The Federal Power to Regulate Wildlife
The first blow to Geer’s state ownership rationale came in the Supreme
Court’s 1920 decision in Missouri v. Holland.183 The Holland Court had to
decide whether the recently enacted Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918
(MBTA)184 impermissibly infringed on state rights guaranteed by the Tenth
Amendment or, alternatively, divested states of their property right in wild
birds.185 Justice Holmes, writing for a 7-2 majority,186 determined that the
treaty and its implementing legislation took precedence over any conflicting
power of regulation by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.187 Holmes
downplayed state ownership as a prohibition on federal regulation of
wildlife:
The State . . . founds its claim of exclusive authority upon an assertion of
title . . . No doubt it is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State
may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does not follow that its
authority is exclusive of paramount powers. To put the claim of the State upon
title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of
anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership.188

Holland thus established the federal treaty-making power as superior to
states’ property interest in animals ferae naturae. Two later cases, Hunt v.
United States189 and Kleppe v. New Mexico,190 ruled that the federal power
over public lands under the Property Clause191 also trumped state ownership

181
182

See infra notes 183–219 (documenting Geer’s decline).

This Article does not address all Supreme Court cases interpreting state/federal conflicts
concerning wildlife regulation and the state ownership doctrine. For a complete discussion of
Supreme Court jurisprudence on this topic, see Coggins, supra note 31; and BEAN & ROWLAND,
supra note 35, at 15–38.
183 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
184 Ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–711 (2000)).
185 Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
186 Justices Van Davanter and Pitney dissented without opinion. Id. at 435.
187 The Supremacy Clause includes an express affirmation of the federal treaty-making
power: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI. The Holland majority implied that
the MBTA was probably a valid exercise of the Congress’s commerce power as well. See
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433. Later circuit court opinions employed this dicta to uphold the MBTA as
valid legislation under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623
(7th Cir. 1937); Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1938).
188 Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (emphasis added).
189 278 U.S. 96 (1928).
190 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
191 “The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
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of wildlife.
In Hunt, the Court upheld the federal government’s removal of excess
deer from the Kaibab National Forest to protect the forest from damage
caused by overgrazing, despite objections from the state that the deer kill
was contrary to state law.192 The Court, with Justice Sutherland writing,
rejected the state’s Geer-based argument that it maintained exclusive
authority to regulate the taking of wildlife, ruling: “[T]he power of the United
States to thus protect its lands and property does not admit of doubt . . . the
game laws or any other statute of the state . . . notwithstanding.”193 A halfcentury later, in 1976, the Kleppe Court extended Hunt’s Property Clause
rationale to validate the federal government’s claim that the Wild FreeRoaming Horses and Burros Act194 preempted state game laws regulating
horses and burros on federal public lands.195 The state argued that the
federal act was unconstitutional because, unlike the deer kill in Hunt, it
aimed to protect the animals, not federal lands themselves.196 A unanimous
Court found this distinction unpersuasive, concluding that the federal
authority over its lands “necessarily includes the power to regulate and
protect wildlife living there.”197 Collectively, Holland, Hunt, and Kleppe
destroyed the argument that state ownership of wildlife superseded federal
species legislation.198

B. Constitutional Limitations on State Wildlife Regulation
Geer’s progeny not only validated federal wildlife laws, they also
curtailed states’ ability to regulate game in ways inconsistent with the United
States Constitution. In 1948, the Supreme Court decided the companion
cases of Toomer v. Witsell199 and Takahashi v. Fish and Game
Commissioner,200 determining that the Privileges and Immunities and the
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3.
192 Hunt, 278 U.S. at 100.
193 Id. See also Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940) (extending Hunt’s
rationale to acquired national forest lands); New Mexico State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410 F.2d
1197 (10th Cir. 1969) (upholding the Secretary of the Interior’s decision to kill certain deer in
the Carlsbad Caverns National Park for research purposes, without compliance with state game
laws and absent a showing of damage to federal property), cert. denied sub nom., New Mexico
State Game Comm’n v. Hickel, 396 U.S. 961 (1969).
194 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1340 (2000). The Act declared wild horses and burros to be “an integral
part of the natural system of public lands” and directed federal public land managers “to protect
and manage [them] as components of the public lands . . . .” Id. §§ 1331, 1333(a).
195 Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 541.
196 Id. at 536–37.
197 Id. at 541. The Court reached this conclusion “despite an unbroken history of state
wildlife management on public grazing lands, and despite the strong economic interest of
grazing rights holders for whom wild horses and burros were major competitors for forage.”
Oliver A. Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute “Takings”?, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 297, 313 (1995).
198 See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 35, at 17–22 (analyzing Holland, Hunt, and Kleppe).
199 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
200 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment impose limitations
on wildlife regulation. In Takahashi, the Court ruled that California could
not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause,201 deny a commercial
fishing license to a residential alien on the ground that he was ineligible for
U.S. citizenship.202 In so deciding, the Court, with Justice Black writing for a
7-2 majority,203 undercut Geer’s state ownership theory, proclaiming: “To
whatever extent the fish in the three-mile belt off California may be ‘capable
of ownership’ by California, we think that ‘ownership’ is inadequate to justify
California in excluding any or all aliens who are lawful residents of the State
from making a living by fishing in the ocean off its shores while permitting
others to do so.”204 Thus, state ownership did not justify harvest regulations
that discriminated against aliens.
In Toomer, the Court examined a South Carolina statute that imposed a
shrimp fishery license fee for non-residents one hundred times greater than
the fee charged residents.205 The Court struck down the fee differential
because it was “so great that its practical effect is virtually exclusionary,”
and thus in violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.206 After
distinguishing several cases relying on the theory of state ownership of
wildlife, the Court observed that:
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction
expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have
power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And
there is no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and the
constitutional command that the State exercise that power . . . so as not to
discriminate without reason against citizens of other States.207

Together, Takahashi and Toomer made explicit that states’ proprietary
interests in wildlife did not immunize state wildlife regulations from the
checks on state power imposed by the Equal Protection and the Privileges
and Immunities Clauses of the United States Constitution. However, neither
case expressly overruled Geer’s Commerce Clause holding, thus paving the
way for Hughes v. Oklahoma.

C. Overruling Geer
By 1979, Geer was ripe for reversal. Not only had the Supreme Court
201 “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
202 Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 421.
203 Justices Reed and Jackson dissented, arguing that state ownership of wildlife allowed
state regulation to prevent wildlife exploitation by aliens. Id. at 427–31.
204 Id. at 421.
205 334 U.S. 385 at 389.
206 Id. at 396–97. The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides: “The Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.” U.S.
CONST. art IV, § 2. The Court has stated that “[this] section, in effect, prevents a State from
discrimination against citizens of other States in favor of its own.” Hague v. Comm. for Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).
207 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402.
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narrowed the significance of Geer’s state ownership theory in the eighty
years since the case was decided,208 the Court had also shifted its
understanding of what activities constituted “commerce,” and were thus
subject to federal regulation. The restrictive Commerce Clause
jurisprudence from the Geer era became increasingly anachronistic as the
national economy evolved in the twentieth century.209 As a consequence of
the New Deal’s attempts to combat the Great Depression, the Court
expanded its definition of commerce after 1937, eventually adopting the
view that Congress could regulate any activity that, when considered
cumulatively with other similarly situated activities, had an effect on
interstate commerce.210 This shift was evident in the context of wildlife
regulation in the 1977 decision Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.211
In Douglas, the Court used a Commerce Clause analysis to rule that
federal legislation licensing foreign fishing vessels in Virginia’s coastal
waters preempted a Virginia law restricting out-of-state vessels from
obtaining commercial fishing licenses.212 Rejecting the state’s argument that
the federal licensing scheme exceeded congressional authority, the Court
explained that while “at earlier times in our history there was some doubt as
to whether Congress had power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the
taking of fish in state waters, there can be no question today that such power
exists where there is some effect on interstate commerce.”213 The Court thus
upheld the federal statute, ruling that “the movement of vessels from one
State to another in search of fish, and back again to processing plants, is
certainly activity which Congress could conclude affects interstate
208
209

See supra notes 183–207 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (concluding that

manufacturing could not be regulated under the Commerce Clause because production did not
directly effect interstate commerce); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 546 (1935) (explaining that there is a “necessary and well-established distinction between
direct and indirect effects [under the Commerce Clause]”, and where “the effect of intrastate
transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect, such transactions remain within the
domain of state power”).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941) (adopting a flexible approach to
the Commerce Clause inquiry and extending Congress’s power to include regulation of
manufacturing); Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (upholding the application of
federal law to home grown wheat under the Commerce Clause because of the cumulative effect
of that wheat on the national market); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
253 (1964) (upholding the constitutionality of parts of the Civil Rights Act that prohibited
discrimination in places of public accommodation under Commerce Clause analysis because of
“overwhelming evidence that discrimination by hotels and motels impedes interstate travel”).
211 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
212 Id. at 282.
213 Id. at 281–82. The Court explained the state ownership doctrine in the following terms:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game preserve, and
it is pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the
Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter has title to these
creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture. . . . The ‘ownership’
language [in the case law] must be understood as no more than a . . . legal fiction
expressing ‘the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource.’

Id. at 284.
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commerce.” 214 Douglas confirmed that the Commerce Clause gave Congress
sufficient authority to regulate wildlife.
Two years after Douglas, in 1979, the Court once again interpreted the
Commerce Clause in the context of wildlife regulation, this time considering
whether the Commerce Clause imposed limits on state wildlife legislation,
even in the absence of federal regulation. The facts of Hughes v.
Oklahoma215 were nearly identical to Geer. At issue was an Oklahoma
statute prohibiting the export of naturally-occurring minnows from the state
but allowing out-of-state transport and sale of minnows raised in a
commercial minnow hatchery. An Oklahoma appellate court had upheld the
statute against an argument that it unreasonably interfered with interstate
commerce, citing the legislation’s conservation purpose and also relying on
the state ownership principles set forth in Geer.216 But the Supreme Court,
with Justice Brennan writing for a 7-2 majority, concluded that the Geer
ownership analysis had “been eroded to the point of virtual extinction” by
previous cases such as Holland, Toomer, and Douglas.217 Consequently, the
Court finally overruled Geer, determining that “challenges under the
Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild animals should be considered
according to the same general rule applied to state regulation of other
natural resources.”218 The Court therefore invalidated the Oklahoma statute,
acknowledging that conservation of minnows might have been a legitimate
reason to justify some discrimination, but citing the availability of less
discriminatory means for achieving that purpose.219 The era of state claims
to ownership of wildlife, epitomized by the Geer decision, seemed over.
VI. LONG LIVE GEER: THE SURVIVAL OF THE STATE OWNERSHIP DOCTRINE
Just as reports of Mark Twain’s demise proved premature, so too was
the demise of the state ownership doctrine in the wake of the Hughes
decision. State statutes and constitutional provisions continued to assert
state ownership of wildlife post-Hughes, and state courts consistently
interpreted Hughes to be limited to situations involving federal-state
conflicts. Thus, the state ownership doctrine lives on in the twenty-first
century in virtually all states, affording states ample authority to regulate the
taking of wildlife and to protect their habitat.

A. The Limits of Hughes v. Oklahoma
Although Hughes overruled state ownership as a vehicle to deny that
wildlife was immune from Commerce Clause restrictions, the case did not
214
215

Id. at 282.

441 U.S. 322 (1979).
Hughes v. State, 572 P.2d 573, 575 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978), rev’d sub nom., Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1970).
217 Hughes, 441 U.S. at 331.
218 Id. at 335.
219 Id. at 336–38. Most troubling to the Court was the fact that the Oklahoma statute did not
attempt to directly limit the number of naturally-occurring minnows taken or to regulate their
disposition within the state. Id.
216
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dislodge the states’ trustee relationship with wildlife that had been
confirmed in Geer. The Hughes majority took care to explain that “the
overruling of Geer does not leave the States powerless to protect and
conserve wild animal life within their borders.”220 In fact, the Court
emphasized that “the general rule we adopt in this case makes ample
allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce
Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild
animals.”221
In his dissenting opinion in Hughes, then Associate Justice Rehnquist,
while acknowledging that “a State does not ‘own’ the wild creatures within
its borders in any conventional sense of the word,” argued that the “concept
expressed by the ‘ownership’ doctrine is not obsolete.”222 Rehnquist
maintained that the ownership theory espoused in Geer recognized
a State’s substantial interest in preserving and regulating the exploitation of the
fish and game . . . within its boundaries for the benefit of its citizens, [which
should prevail unless the challenged regulation] conflicts with a federal statute
or treaty; . . . allocates access in a manner that that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment; . . . or represents a naked attempt to discriminate against out-ofstate enterprises in favor of in-state businesses unrelated to any purpose of
conservation.223

Fairly read, the thrust of Hughes was simply that the state may not exercise
its ownership of wildlife in a manner that conflicts with federal prerogatives
protected by the Constitution. Recent scholarly commentary
overwhelmingly confirms this interpretation of Hughes.224 More importantly,
so do the judicial and legislative actions of the states since 1979.

B. State Courts: Confining Hughes to Federal-State Conflicts
Despite Hughes’ overruling of the Geer ownership doctrine on the issue
of the ability of states to insulate themselves from Commerce Clause limits,
220

Id. at 338.
Id. at 335–36.
222 Id. at 341 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
223 Id. at 342.
224 See, e.g., Houck, supra note 197, at 311 n.77 (“The trust analogy was not overruled in
Hughes and remains the most accurate expression of this state interest: Wildlife belongs to
221

everyone and the state has a special authority, and obligation, to ensure its perpetuation.”);
Coggins, supra note 31, at 321 (noting that the Geer principles “have continuing relevance” even
after Hughes and concluding that “the State remains the trustee for the people even if it is not a
technical owner [of wildlife]”); Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens Patriae
Doctrines: Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 87, 93–94
(1995). (“While overruling Geer as to the constitutionality of state prohibitions against interstate
wildlife shipping, Hughes preserved the sovereign ownership analysis set forth in Geer.”);
Horner, supra note 128, at 40 (“In Hughes v. Oklahoma, the Court overruled Geer to the extent
Geer held that state ‘ownership’ in wildlife allowed it the right to interfere with interstate
commerce. However, in so doing, Hughes did not disturb the public trust in wildlife.”); Wood,
supra note 178, at 62 (arguing that Hughes “neither overruled the sovereign trusteeship
underlying the doctrine nor precluded its use in other contexts of sovereign wildlife ownership
which do not conflict with the Constitution”).
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state courts continue to rely on the rationale that the state “owns” wildlife in
trust for its citizens as justification to regulate animals ferae naturae.225 Some
courts have explicitly distinguished Hughes to endorse state ownership as a
basis for regulation when no federal constitutional issue exists. For
example, in Montana v. Fertterer,226 the Montana Supreme Court upheld a
felony criminal mischief conviction for illegally killing elk, deer, and
antelope under the theory that wild animals were “public property” under
the Montana criminal mischief statute because the state continues to have
an “ownership interest in wild game held by it in its sovereign capacity for
the use and benefit of the people.”227 The court acknowledged that Hughes
“expressly abandoned the title ownership theory as promulgated in Geer,”
but concluded that Hughes was controlling absent “federal constitutional
questions of interstate commerce, equal protection, or privileges and
immunities.”228 Similarly, in Pullen v. Ulmer,229 the Alaska Supreme Court
rejected a citizen initiative application to regulate allocation of salmon
fisheries because “salmon are public assets of the state which may not be
appropriated by initiative.”230 The Pullen court ruled that while Hughes
“struck down [the contested statute] as violative of the commerce clause, . . .
[n]othing in the opinion . . . indicated any retreat from the state’s public trust
duty discussed in Geer.”231 Other courts have agreed, explicitly
distinguishing Hughes in the absence of a federal question or conflict.232
Many post-Hughes courts have simply embraced state sovereign
ownership of wildlife without mentioning the 1979 Supreme Court decision.
For instance, in 1995, in State v. Bartee,233 a Texas appellate court observed
that “[Texas] courts have consistently referred to ownership of wild animals
as being in ‘the state’ or belonging to ‘the state,’” determining that the state
may be the “owner” of wildlife in theft cases.234 Similarly, the Alaska
Supreme Court upheld a state regulation that gave preference for taking of
225 See Horner, supra note 128, at 40 (writing in the year 2000 and noting that “[i]n the
century that has passed since Geer, the courts have not backed off from the recognition of [the]
trust relationship”); Wood, supra note 178, at 64 (arguing that “while the state ownership
doctrine has fallen sway to greater constitutional interests, the core property-based principles
of sovereign trusteeship over ferae naturae underlying the doctrine endure to add a critical
dimension to modern wildlife issues”).
226 841 P.2d 467 (Mont. 1992), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gatts, 928 P.2d 114
(Mont. 1996).
227 Id. at 470–71.
228

Id.

229

923 P.2d 54 (Alaska 1996).

230

Id. at 60–61.
231 Id. at 60.
232 See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 854 F. Supp. 843, 851 (D. Wyo. 1994)
(analyzing Hughes and determining that a Wyoming statute providing that all wildlife in the
state is the property of the state did not violate the federal commerce power); Attorney Gen. v.
Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (determining state could maintain a civil
action for damages resulting from unlawful taking of perch and whitefish from public waters
pursuant to a “trusteeship” analysis; acknowledging Hughes, but noting that “[i]n the wake of
Geer’s decline a new legal fiction has solidified, i.e., that the state is ‘public trustee’ of [wildlife]
resources, which are held in trust for all the people of the state in their collective capacity”).
233 894 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App. 1995).
234 Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
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moose, deer, elk, and caribou by residents for personal or family use over
taking by nonresidents because “the state acts as ‘trustee’ of the naturally
occurring fish and wildlife in the state for the benefit of its citizens.”235
Several other states have judicially endorsed state ownership and wildlife
trust principles without distinguishing, or even citing Hughes.236

C. State Legislatures: Continuing to Endorse State Ownership of Wildlife
Like state courts, state legislatures have not interpreted Hughes to
disturb claims of state ownership of wildlife. In fact, the overwhelming
majority of states have codified some articulation of the state ownership
doctrine in their statutes.237 The statutory declarations of state ownership
are straightforward and direct. For example, Georgia law provides that: “The
ownership of, jurisdiction over, and control of all wildlife, . . . are declared to
be in the State . . . .”238 The West Virginia Code grants “ownership of and title
to all wild animals, wild birds, both migratory and resident, and all fish,
amphibians, and all forms of aquatic life in the State of West Virginia” to “the
State, as trustee for the people.”239 Oregon provides simply that: “Wildlife is

235

Shepard v. Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, 897 P.2d 33, 40 (Alaska 1995).
State v. Couch, 103 P.3d 671, 677 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that in Oregon “‘[i]t is a
generally recognized principle that migratory fish in the navigable waters of a state, like game
within its borders, are classed as animals ferae naturae, the title to which, so far as that claim is
capable of being asserted before possession is obtained, is held by the state, in its sovereign
capacity in trust for all its citizens’”) (quoting State v. Hume, 95 P. 808, 810 (1908)); People v.
Brady, 286 Cal. Rptr. 19, 22 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“We conclude that like other wild game,
the abalone caught in the state’s coastal waters belong to the people of the State of California in
their collective, sovereign capacity. No individual property right exists in these shellfish. Rather,
the state acts as trustee to protect and regulate them for the common good.”); Glave v. Mich.
Terminix Co., 407 N.W.2d 36, 37 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (determining that “‘wild game’ belongs to
the state and is subject to the state’s power of regulation and control, [and] an individual
acquires in such game only the qualified property interest which the state permits”) (citing
Aikens v. Mich. Dep’t of Conservation, 198 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1972)); Ridenour v. Furness,
504 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (“Title to wild game and fish is in the state in its
sovereign capacity as the trustee of all the citizens in common. No individual has a property
right in fish or game while in its natural state.”) (citing Smith v. State, 58 N.E. 1044, 1045 (Ind.
1900)); Rogers v. State, 491 So. 2d 987, 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (declaring “ownership of wild
animals is vested in the state”); O’Brien v. State, 711 P.2d 1144, 1148–49 (Wyo. 1986) (“[W]ildlife
within the borders of a state are owned by the state in its sovereign capacity for the common
benefits of all its people. . . . [T]he enlightened concept of this ownership is one of a trustee with
the power and duty to protect, preserve and nurture the wild game.”); Collopy v. Wildlife
Comm’n, 625 P.2d 994, 999 (Colo. 1981) (denying plaintiff’s claim that withholding his right to
hunt on his own land worked a constitutional taking because “‘[t]he ownership of wild game is
in the state for the benefit of all the people’”) (quoting Maitland v. People, 23 P.2d 116, 117
(Colo. 1933)).
237 See Houck, supra note 197, at 309 n.76 (commenting that the majority of states claim title
to or ownership of their resident fish and wildlife in their statutes); GOBLE & FREYFOGLE,
WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 426 (“By late in the twentieth century, the overwhelming
majority of states had embraced [the state ownership doctrine]—typically by statute . . . .”). See
also RUTH S. MUSGRAVE & MARY ANNE STEIN, STATE WILDLIFE LAWS HANDBOOK (1993)
(summarizing state wildlife laws).
238 GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1-3(b) (2002).
239 W. VA. CODE § 20-2-3 (2002).
236
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the property of the state.”240 In all, more than thirty states have codified
some version of the state ownership doctrine in their wildlife statues.241
A handful of states have included wildlife trust provisions in their state
constitutions. The constitutional provisions are also clear, or have been
made clear by the judiciary. Article VIII, section 3 of the Alaska Constitution,
for example, declares that, “Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish,
wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”242 And the

240

OR. REV. STAT. § 498.002(1) (2004).

241

See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 9-11-81, 9-11-230 (2004) (declaring that the state of Alabama has

vested title to freshwater fish and “to all wild birds and wild animals”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-102 (2004) (“Wildlife, both resident and migratory, native or introduced, found in this
state . . . are property of the state . . . .”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-43-104 (2004) (“All game and fish
except fish in private ponds, found in the limits of this state, are declared to be the property of
this state.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-101 (2004) (“All wildlife in this state not lawfully acquired
and held by private ownership is declared to be the property of the state.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
7, § 201 (2004) (“Rare and endangered species are a public trust . . . .”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36103(a) (2004) (“All wildlife, including all wild animals, wild birds and fish, within the state of
Idaho, is hereby declared to be the property of the state . . . .”); 515 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5, 520
ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2.1 (2004) (declaring that the title to all wild birds and wild mammals, and all
aquatic life within the state, is in the state); IND. CODE § 14-22-1-1 (2004) (“All wild animals . . .
are the property of the people of Indiana”); IOWA CODE § 481A.2 (2004) (“The title and
ownership of all fish . . . and of all wild game, animals, and birds . . . are hereby declared to be in
the state . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-703 (2004) (“The ownership of and title to all wildlife, both
resident and migratory, in the state . . . are hereby declared to be in the state.”); MINN. STAT.
§ 97A.025 (2004) (“The ownership of wild animals of the state is in the state, in its sovereign
capacity for the benefit of all the people . . . .”); MO. REV. STAT. § 252.030 (2004) (“The ownership
of and title to all wildlife of and within the state, whether resident, migratory or imported, dead
or alive, are hereby declared to be in the state of Missouri.”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 501.100(1) (2004)
(“Wildlife in this state not domesticated and in its natural habitat is part of the natural resources
belonging to the people of the State of Nevada.”); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0105
(McKinney 2004) (“The State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea, and
protected insects in the state . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-131(a) (2004) (“The marine and
esturine and wildlife resources of the State belong to the people of the State as a whole . . . .”);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-01-03 (2004) (“The ownership of and title to all wildlife within this state
is in the state . . . .”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531-02 (West 2004) (“The ownership of and the
title to all wild animals in this state, not legally confined or held by private ownership legally
acquired, is in the state, which holds such title in trust for the benefit of all the people.”); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 29, § 7-204 (2004) (“All wildlife found in this state is the property of the state.”); 34 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 2161(a) (West 2004) (“The proprietary ownership, jurisdiction and control of game
or wildlife . . . is vested in the Commonwealth . . . .”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-1-10 (Law. Co-op.
2004) (“All wild birds, wild game, and fish . . . are the property of the state.”); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 41-1-2 (2004) (“[A]ny game bird, game animal, or game fish, or any part
thereof . . . shall always and under all circumstances be and remain the property of the
state . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-4-101(a) (2004) (“The ownership of and title to all forms of
wildlife within the jurisdiction of the state . . . are hereby declared to be in the state . . . .”); TEX.
PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 1.011(a) (Vernon 2004) (“All wild animals . . . are the property of the
people of this state.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-3 (2004) (“All wildlife existing within this state,
not held by private ownership and legally acquired, is the property of the state.”); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 29.1-557 (2004) (“Wild birds, wild animals and fish are the property of the
Commonwealth . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE § 77.04.012 (2004) (“Wildlife, fish, and shellfish are the
property of the state.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-103 (2004) (“For the purposes of this act, all
wildlife in Wyoming is the property of the state.”).
242 ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3. See also id. § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all
other replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and
maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.”).
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Hawaii Constitution similarly provides:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural
resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall
promote the development and utilization of these resources in a manner
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-sufficiency of
the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the State for the
benefit of the people.243

Pennsylvania and Louisiana have also included wildlife trust provisions in
their constitutions, and have not felt the need to alter or delete them in a
post-Hughes world.244

D. Current Limitations on State Species Regulation under the State
Ownership/Wildlife Trust Theory
The state ownership doctrine—an odd mixture of sovereign and
proprietary powers—has survived judicial attacks and remains vitally
relevant to wildlife regulation in the twenty-first century. Nothing indicates
that the doctrine’s role will diminish any time soon, especially considering
Congress’s continued deference to state sensibilities in the matter of wildlife
regulation,245 and the current Supreme Court’s preference for protecting
state legislative authority.246 That said, state power under a wildlife

243

HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.

244

See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come.
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all people.

See also LA. CONST. art IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and
the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected,
conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety and
welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”). The Supreme
Court of Louisiana has determined that the Louisiana Constitution “establishes a public trust
doctrine requiring the state to protect, conserve and replenish all natural resources, including
the wildlife and fish of the state, for the benefit of its people.” State v. McHugh, 630 So. 2d 1259,
1265 (La. 1994) (citing LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1). See also Horner, supra note 128, at 58–72
(providing analysis of cases interpreting the constitutional codification of the wildlife trust in
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, California, and Alaska).
245 As explained by Professor Coggins:
Federal law does not directly affect the great majority of non-avian wildlife in America
(mammals, fishes, crustaceans, insects, amphibians, and so forth); it directly protects
only a small . . . number of endangered or threatened species plus, of course, the dozen
or so species of marine mammals and two ‘species’ of feral ungulates.
Coggins, supra note 31, at 321 n.230.
246 Younger v. Harris introduced the current Court’s understanding of “Our Federalism,”
instructing that the concept represents “a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate
interests of both State and National Governments, and in which the National Government . . .
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ownership or public trust theory is not boundless. The discussion below
sketches the few situations where states are barred from regulating wildlife
pursuant to their proprietary interest in animals ferae naturae.247
States clearly have broad powers and discretion to conserve their
wildlife. State regulation, however, must be consistent with constitutional
limits and guarantees. Therefore, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled,
state wildlife regulation cannot 1) unduly burden interstate commerce,248 2)
abridge the privileges and immunities of non-residents in pursuing their
livelihood,249 or 3) deny equal protection to resident aliens.250
In addition to having to comply with constitutional restraints, states
cannot forbid what the federal government has expressly permitted or
legislate in ways that defeat the intent of a federal statute.251 State wildlife
laws, therefore, may be preempted by legislation enacted pursuant to
Congress’s treaty-making power,252 the Commerce Clause,253 or the Property
always endeavors to [act] in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of
the States.” 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). For further discussion of the Rehnquist Court’s use of the
term, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (“Although the Constitution grants broad
powers to Congress, our federalism requires that Congress treat the States in a manner
consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the governance of
the Nation.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 (1997) (arguing that separation between
state and national government “is one of the Constitution’s structural protections of liberty”);
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[O]ur federalism”
allows the states, independent from federal direction, “to devise various solutions where the
best solution is far from clear.”); Ankenbrant v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992) (declining to
extend the concept of comity, which the Court found “critical to Younger’s ‘Our Federalism,’”
when there was no pending state proceeding); and Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 208–09
(1988) (White, J., concurring) (opining that “Our Federalism” precludes federal courts from
adjudicating damage claims when a state criminal case dealing with the same issue is pending).
247 Note that this discussion is not exhaustive. A more complete accounting of the
state/federal balance regarding wildlife regulation can be found in BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note
35, at 15–38.
248 See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), discussed supra at notes 215–223 and
accompanying text. But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (determining, in a case
substantially similar to Hughes, that a Maine law that prohibited the importation of bait fish into
the state did not violate the dormant commerce clause because it had a valid local purpose,
which could not be achieved through means less restrictive of interstate commerce).
249 See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), discussed supra at notes 205–207 and
accompanying text. Note, however, that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Privileges and
Immunities Clause to protect only “livelihoods” and not recreational pursuits. See Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (upholding a Montana statute that
permitted the state to charge nonresident hunters higher fees than resident hunters because
recreational hunting is not a “fundamental” right, and therefore not protected by the Privileges
and Immunities Clause).
250 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948), discussed supra notes 201–
204 and accompanying text.
251 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 156, at 376–98 (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning express and implied preemption).
252 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), discussed supra
at notes 183–188 and accompanying text.
253 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; See Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977),
discussed supra at notes 211–214 and accompanying text. Examples of statutory wildlife
protections promulgated pursuant to the commerce power include: the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2000); the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–
3378 (2000); the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1421h (2000); and
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Clause.254 The Property Clause also provides federal agencies authority to
regulate wildlife on federal lands, even in contravention of state law.255
Additionally, Indian treaties, agreements, executive orders, and statutes may
override state law and establish Native American rights to take fish and
game without a state license, free of state regulation.256
VII. OWNERSHIP IN TRUST: BEYOND REGULATORY AUTHORITY
As detailed above, state ownership of wildlife remains the basis for
much of the wildlife regulation adopted by the several states.257 In the past
century, however, the police power—the sovereign’s power to enact
regulations for citizens’ health and welfare—has become an alternative, and
arguably primary, source of governmental authority to protect natural
resources, including wildlife.258 At least one commentator has argued that
due to the power granted state legislatures under the modern police power,
“there currently is little room or need for the public trust doctrine to play a
meaningful role in promoting sovereign authority” over wildlife and other
natural resources.259 But that argument assumes that wildlife trust principles
do no more than mirror state police powers. While strong judicial
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883
(2000).
254 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), discussed
supra at notes 190, 194–197 and accompanying text.
255 Hunt v. United States, 278 U.S. 96 (1928), discussed supra at notes 189, 192–193 and
accompanying text. In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the authority of the
President and Congress to set aside lands for the protection of wildlife, and the withdrawal of
water necessary to serve that purpose overrides conflicting junior state-created water rights.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138–39 (1976).
256 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 432–37 (4th ed. 1998) (summarizing
preemption doctrine in the Indian law context). As a general proposition, Indian tribes maintain
exclusive jurisdiction over hunting and fishing on reservation lands. See, e.g., New Mexico v.
Mescelaro Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 338-44 (1983) (ruling that state of New Mexico was
preempted from regulating hunting and fishing on Mescelaro reservation). This authority,
however, is weakened when tribes assert control over non-Indian hunting and fishing on
reservation land that is not Indian-owned. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557–
68 (1981) (determining that the Crow Tribe had no tribal authority to regulate hunting and
fishing by non-Indians on lands within Crow reservation owned in fee by non-Indians). While
Indians and Indian tribes are usually subject to state authority for off-reservation activities, the
state may be precluded from interfering with off-reservation hunting and fishing conducted
pursuant to treaty-reserved rights. See JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 508–42 (2002) (analyzing the scope
and extent of Indian treaty-reserved rights to hunt and fish); Michael C. Blumm & Brett M.
Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407,
435–45 (1998) (explaining treaty hunting and fishing rights as property rights).
257 See supra notes 225–44 and accompanying text.
258 See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 396–425 (chronicling the
transition from “ownership” to “police power” as the dominant metaphor for sovereign
authority to regulate natural resources). See also State v. Jack, 539 P.2d 726, 728 (Mont. 1975)
(“[A] state has the power to preserve and regulate its wildlife. In the nineteenth century, it was
commonly held that this power derived from the common law concept of ‘sovereign
ownership’. . . . Under more modern theory, the power has been held to lie within the purview
of a state’s police powers.”).
259 Lazarus, supra note 155, at 665.
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acceptance of the police power as authority to regulate wildlife may
represent a viable and important way for states to protect wild animals
within their borders, it hardly makes the trust principles announced in Geer
obsolete. As another commentator observed
The public trust doctrine protects natural resources, and therefore the public,
from the failure of legislatures, state agencies, and administrative personnel to
recognize the state’s duty to protect the corpus of the wildlife trust for future
generations. . . .
....
Under the police power alone, courts do not enforce a state’s affirmative duty
to protect its wildlife. In contrast, under the public trust doctrine, states must
protect the corpus of their wildlife trust.260

Thus, the state ownership—or wildlife trust—theory not only provides
authority to states to regulate wildlife separate and distinct from the police
power, it also imposes a duty on the state to safeguard its wild animals for
coming generations. The Geer majority opinion clearly endorsed this view:
[T]he ownership of the sovereign authority [in wildlife] is in trust for all the
people of the state, and hence, by implication, it is the duty of the legislature to
enact such laws as will best preserve the subject of the trust, and secure its
beneficial use in the future to the people of the state.261

Unfortunately, few cases directly address the duties and obligations of a
state under the common ownership theory affirmed by Geer.262 However,
because the sovereign trusteeship over wildlife is part of a larger body of law
concerning “public trust” principles that developed outside the context of
wildlife regulation, public trust law remains directly relevant to states’
wildlife trust responsibilities.263

260

Musiker et al., supra note 224, at 109, 112.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1896) (emphasis added).
262 But see Gilbert v. State, 803 P.2d 391, 399 (Alaska 1990) (observing that “‘migrating
schools of fish, while in inland waters, are the property of the state, held in trust for the benefit
of all the people of the state, and the obligation and authority to equitably and wisely regulate
the harvest is that of the state’”) (quoting Metlakatla Indian Cmty. v. Egan, 362 P.2d 901, 915
(Alaska 1961)) (emphasis added); see also infra notes 277–295 and accompanying text
(recognizing that several state courts have ruled that the state has a duty to bring suit to collect
damages when its wildlife trust has been damaged).
263 See Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to
Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728–29 (1989) (arguing that “the common
interest in wildlife is sufficiently like the common interest in water to justify similar public trust
doctrine protection”); John D. Echeverria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights:
Wildlife Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 355 (2003) (“In keeping with
the leading public trust decisions involving water resources or tidelands, [state ownership]
language could be interpreted to mean that the doctrine of public ownership of wildlife
supports imposing affirmative obligations on government officials to protect wildlife.”); Musiker
et al., supra note 224, at 95–99 (advocating for application of cases concerning the public trust
in navigable waters and submerged lands to wildlife). See also supra notes 134–141 (arguing
261
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A. Affirmative Duties to Consider Potential Adverse Impacts and Prevent
Substantial Impairment
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,264 the Supreme Court’s famous
1892 decision embracing the public trust doctrine in the context of
submerged lands, provides some guidance concerning the state’s
responsibilities to protect the public trust. In Illinois Central, Justice Field,
who four years later dissented in Geer,265 employed trust concepts to declare
invalid the state’s grant of a 1,000-acre portion of Lake Michigan’s bed to the
railroad, ruling that “[s]uch abdication is not consistent with the exercise of
that trust which requires the government of the State to preserve [navigable
waters and the lands under them] for the use of the public.”266 In reaching
this decision,267 the Court declared that states may not take actions causing
“substantial impairment” to the corpus of a public trust.268
In 1983, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine
County (Mono Lake),269 the California Supreme Court expanded the duties
articulated by the Illinois Central Court more than a century earlier. In Mono
Lake, several environmental groups sought an injunction to prevent the
diversion of water from nonnavigable streams in the Mono Lake watershed
based on the theory that the waters were protected by the public trust.270
Among other things, the contested diversions had caused rapid depletion of
the water level at Mono Lake, transforming Negit Island—a major breeding
ground for California gulls—into a peninsula and exposing the birds to
coyote predation.271
Assuming that the public trust required states to protectively manage
trust resources, the court ordered California authorities to reconsider the
diversions it had authorized. In doing so, the court ruled that the state must:
1) undertake advance consideration of public trust values before approving
actions affecting trust resources,272 2) act to preserve trust values where
feasible to do so,273 and 3) continually supervise actions that affect trust
resources.274 While Mono Lake did not hold that wildlife is subject to the

that state ownership of wildlife evolved from early public trust cases such as Arnold v. Mundy
and Martin v. Waddell).
264 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
265 Justice Field dissented in Geer on the grounds that wild game was not the property of
the state and that a lawfully killed animal was an article of commerce subject to federal control.
Geer, 161 U.S. at 535–42 (Field, J., dissenting).
266 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
267 It has never been clear whether the Court ruled that the legislature’s grant to the railroad
was void or merely upheld the 1873 Illinois legislature’s repeal of the 1869 legislature’s grant to
Illinois Central.
268 Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453.
269 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
270 Id. at 712.
271 Id. at 711.
272 Id. at 712.
273 Id. at 728.
274 Id. In addition, the Mono Lake court recognized the right of state citizens to enforce the
duties required by the public trust doctrine in state courts. See Michael C. Blumm & Thea
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public trust, it did rule that conservation of the lake “for nesting and feeding
by birds” fell under the protection afforded by the public trust doctrine in
navigable waters.275 Indeed, the primary beneficiaries of the altered water
flows required as a result of the Mono Lake decision were birds on the
Pacific flyway.276
Although few wildlife cases have fleshed out the fiduciary obligations of
the states under the ownership concept articulated in Geer, the duties
imposed by the Illinois Central and Mono Lake courts seem applicable to the
wildlife context. To fulfill the duty announced by these two cases, states
must consider the potential adverse effects of an action affecting trust
resources, in order to avoid actions that could cause substantial impairment.
In addition, they must take steps to prevent harm to the wildlife trust where
feasible to do so, as well as commit resources to continually supervise
actions that may imperil animals ferae naturae.

B. The Power to Collect Damages for Injuries to the Trust Corpus
One area of the states’ trusteeship over wildlife that has been frequently
addressed by courts is the state power to seek compensation for injury to
wild animals. With the exception of two early rulings,277 courts have
uniformly upheld a common law right for the state to sue for damages to the
corpus of its wildlife trust.278 In fact, most courts have concluded that the
state not only has the ability, but also the obligation to bring suit when its
wildlife resources are imperiled.
In State v. City of Bowling Green,279 the Ohio Supreme Court concluded
that the state “ha[d] the obligation to bring suit” for fish killed by negligent
operation of a municipal sewage treatment plant because “the state is
deemed to be the trustee of [wildlife] for the benefit of the public.”280
Similarly, a Virginia federal district court ruled that the state of Virginia,
under its “duty to protect and preserve the public’s interest in natural
wildlife resources,” was obligated to file suit to obtain damages for
pollution-killed waterfowl.281 And in New Jersey Department of

Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power and Light Company
Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 712–
13 (1995) (commenting on the importance of the Mono Lake court’s affirmation of citizens’ right
to enforce trust duties).
275 Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 719.
276 See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 274, at 718 (documenting that increased lake levels
restored critical nesting habitat for California gulls and other migratory birds).
277 See State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61 (N.D. 1972) (recognizing state
ownership of wildlife, but concluding that state did not have sufficient property interest in fish
killed as a result of cheese company’s effluent discharge to support a civil action for damages);
Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 232 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967) (determining that state was
“not the owner [of more than 70,000 fish killed as a result of pollution] as it is of its lands and
buildings so as to support a civil action for damages”).
278 See GOBLE & FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW, supra note 4, at 444 (listing cases upholding
power of state to seek compensation for injury to wildlife).
279 313 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio 1974).
280 Id. at 411.
281 In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980).
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(Jersey Central),282 a New Jersey appellate court upheld a lower court’s
determination that the state was justified in seeking monetary damages for
the death of more than 500,000 fish, which resulted from a sudden drop in
water temperature caused by an unscheduled shutdown at Jersey Central
Power’s nuclear power plant. The court observed: [t]he State has not only
the right but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation to ensure that the rights
of the public to a viable marine environment are protected, and to seek
compensation for any diminution in that trust corpus.283 Courts in
Washington, Maine, and Maryland have also supported common law
damages claims based on state ownership and wildlife trust principles.284
Most recoveries have involved fish and wildlife killed by pollution or habitat
destruction, but at least one court has awarded monetary damages for the
illegal taking of fish.285
Although courts have consistently awarded damages for injury to the
wildlife trust corpus, they have had difficulty determining the measure of
damages warranted.286 Some courts have employed a market-value
approach, while others have used restoration value as the appropriate
measure of damages. In Jersey Central, for instance, the court refused to
“speculate” as to the monetary value of fish killed by the drop in water
temperature and awarded the state only the wholesale value of the dead
fish.287 In contrast, in Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni,288 a Puerto Rico
federal district court awarded more than $6 million to the Puerto Rican
government for replacement of its marine flora and fauna destroyed as a
result of a massive crude oil spill in the Caribbean Sea.289 On appeal, the
First Circuit dismissed the defendant’s argument that damages should be
based on diminution in market value, noting that market methodologies
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336 A.2d 750 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 351 A.2d 337 (N.J.

1976).
283
284

Id. at 759 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Wash. Dep’t of Fisheries v. Gillette, 621 P.2d 764, 766–67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)

(holding that state has right and “fiduciary obligation” to bring action to recover losses from
pollution damage to fishery because fish are the “property” of the people) (quoting State ex rel.
Bacich v. Huse, 59 P.2d 1101, 1103 (Wash. 1936)); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097,
1099–1100 (Me. 1973) (determining that state’s sovereign ownership of its waters and marine
life allowed for damages claim to recover for harm resulting from 100,000 gallons of bunker oil
spilled into Hussey Sound); Maryland v. Amerada Hess, 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972)
(determining that state had standing to sue for harm caused by oil spill in Baltimore Harbor
because of public trust relationship to its waters and wildlife therein).
285 See Attorney Gen. v. Hermes, 339 N.W.2d 545, 551 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (damages
recovered for fish taken by commercial fisher in violation of fishing laws under wildlife trust
claim).
286 Courts’ struggles with natural resource valuation are well documented. See generally
Frank B. Cross, Natural Resource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L REV. 269 (1989); Judith
Robinson, Note, The Role of Nonuse Values in Natural Resources Damages: Past, Present, and
Future, 75 TEX. L. REV. 189 (1996); Faith Halter & Joel T. Thomas, Recovery of Damages by
States for Fish and Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 5 (1982).
287 Jersey Central, 336 A.2d at 760. Amazingly, the court awarded only $935 for the death of
more than 500,000 menhaden killed by thermal shock. Id.
288 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978), aff’d in part and vacated in part, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981).
289 Id. at 1344–45.

2005]

THE PIONEER SPIRIT

145

often fail to account for harm to “unspoiled natural areas of considerable
ecological value, [which] have little or no commercial value.”290
In recent years, legislatures have addressed how to assess damages
resulting from destruction of wildlife. For example, Congress included
natural resource damages provisions in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,291 the Clean Water Act,292
and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.293 Several state legislatures have also
passed laws permitting and guiding the recovery of natural resources
damages.294 Significantly, many of these statutes expressly favor restoration,
rehabilitation, and replacement costs over a market-value approach.295
Although detailed analysis of state and federal natural resource damages
statutes is beyond the scope of this article, existing statutory provisions may
prove persuasive in courts’ damages valuations for claims brought under a
common law, public trust theory of liability.

C. The Wildlife Trust As An Affirmative Takings Defense
State ownership of wildlife may also serve as an affirmative defense to
takings claims. The 1992 Supreme Court decision Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council296 declared that the government could defeat a takings claim
at the threshold stage if it proved that an owner’s use of land was restricted
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Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st Cir. 1980).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675, 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000).
292 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, 1321(f)(4) (2000).
293 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2761, 2706.
294 See, e.g., 34 PA. STAT. ANN. § 2161 (West 2005) (declaring that “[t]he Commonwealth has
sufficient interest in game or wildlife living in a free state to give it standing, through its
authorized agents, to recover compensatory and punitive damages in a civil action against any
person who kills any game or wildlife or who damages any game or wildlife habitat”); CAL.
HARB. & NAV. CODE § 293 (West 2005) (establishing liability for “any damage or injury to the
natural resources of the state, including, but not limited to, marine and wildlife resources,
caused by the discharge or leakage of petroleum, fuel oil, or hazardous substances”); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 115B.04(1)(3) (2005) (making persons who release hazardous substances liable for
“[a]ll damages for any injury, to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources”).
295 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (expressly providing that the measure of damages caused
by oil or other hazardous substances under the CWA is the cost “of replacing or restorating
such resources”); 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (specifying measure of damages under OPA as the cost
of restoring the natural resources plus the interim losses of both use and certain nonuse
values). CERCLA’s natural resource damages provisions are not as specific as those in the CWA
and the OPA concerning how damages should be measured. The D.C. Circuit, however, has
ruled that CERCLA “evinces a clear congressional intent to make restoration costs the basic
measure of damages.” Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 448 (1989) (citing
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(2) (2000), which provides that all damages recovered under CERCLA “shall
be retained . . . for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural
resources”).
Oregon attempted to simplify determining restoration costs for fish and wildlife loss by
establishing a valuation table. Under this scheme, destruction of individual members of various
species results in varying amounts of liability—for example, $750 for elk; $3,500 for mountain
sheep; $50 for wild turkey; and $125 for salmon or steelhead trout. OR. REV. STAT. § 466.992(2)
(2003).
296 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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by a background principle of property law inherent in the owner’s title at
purchase.297 As explained above, courts have recognized states’ proprietary
interests in wildlife since at least the 1880s.298 Under this time-honored tenet
of state property law, takings claims based on statutes and regulations
protecting endangered and other species should be denied at the threshold
level.299
At least two post-Lucas courts have endorsed state ownership of
wildlife as a defense to takings challenges. In New York v. Sour Mountain
Realty, Inc.,300 New York’s intermediate appellate court addressed a takings
claim based on a county court injunction ordering removal of landowner’s
fence, which precluded threatened snakes from reaching important forage
habitat.301 The court affirmed the lower court’s injunction and also denied
the landowner’s takings claim, determining that “[t]he State’s interest in
protecting its wild animals is a venerable principle that can properly serve as
a legitimate basis” for denying a takings claim.302
The California Court of Appeals also employed the wildlife trust as a
Lucas background principle to reject a takings challenge concerning the
denial of a timber harvest permit to prevent threats to endangered species,
including the marbled murrelet.303 The California court observed that
“wildlife regulation of some sort has been historically a part of the
preexisting law of property.”304
These courts’ observations that state wildlife protection can be a
background principle of property law appear to be a reasonable application
of the Supreme Court’s Lucas decision.305 The full extent of this defense to
takings liability, however, will be determined as more courts encounter the
issue.
VIII. CONCLUSION

297 Specifically, Justice Scalia, author of the Lucas majority opinion, announced a defense to
a constitutional taking if a regulation was merely forbidding uses that would be prohibited by
“background principles of the state’s law of property and nuisance.” Id. at 1029.
298 See supra notes 148–66 and accompanying text.
299 For in-depth analysis of the state ownership/wildlife trust argument as a defense to
takings claims, see Echeverria & Lurman, supra note 263, at 354–56; Babcock, supra note 88, at
883–98; Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles As Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321, 341–54 (2005).
300 714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (2000).
301 Id. at 84.
302

Id.
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Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338, 347 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1993). The California Supreme Court denied review of this case without opinion on March 18,
1994, thereby upholding the appellate court’s decision. However, the Supreme Court also
determined, pursuant to California Court Rules 976, 977, and 979, that the lower court decision
would not be officially published (even though it had been previously published). Consequently,
the Sierra Club decision cannot be cited in documents submitted to California courts. CAL. CT.
R. 976, 977, 979.
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Id.
See Babcock, supra note 88, at 889 (noting that “the continued vitality of [the state

wildlife “ownership” theory] and supportive common law maxims would appear to make them
background principles of state common law that arguably inhere in the title to property”).

2005]

THE PIONEER SPIRIT

147

The rule of capture originated in Roman wildlife law, but even in Rome
capture was not unfettered, as the government possessed the authority to
control harvests.306 In medieval England, capture was subject to royal
authority to create forests and dispense hunting franchises.307 That
precedent was employed by American states to create the state ownership
doctrine, under which they could curtail the overharvesting that occurred in
the nineteenth century. State ownership was ratified by the Supreme Court
in 1896,308 but reduced to a legal fiction by the Court eighty years later.309
Despite that dismissive characterization by the Court, virtually all states
continue to claim ownership of wildlife within their borders.310
State ownership of wildlife is not merely a quaint anachronism with
marginal relevance in an era of plenary police power regulation. The
doctrine, hardly static in the past, offers fertile opportunities for growth in
the future. Its concept of ownership in trust may impose duties as well as
authority on states and may equip citizens with the ability to enforce those
duties.311 States may also invoke the wildlife trust to collect damages for
injuries to wildlife and their habitats.312 And state regulation of wildlife
harvests and wildlife habitat may be insulated from takings claims due to the
state ownership doctrine.313 If the state ownership doctrine is to embrace
these principles, state attorneys general and wildlife advocates need to
understand the possibilities explored in this article and urge state courts to
adopt them.
The American rule of wildlife capture has deep historic roots. An
exploration of those roots reveals that capture doctrine, far from being
absolutist in nature, has always been fitted to meet the felt necessities of
societies that employed it. Beginning with Roman law, capture has always
been restrained by state authority.314 In American jurisprudence, that
authority has been buttressed by the state ownership doctrine, under which
states own wildlife in trust for their citizens. The truth is that the rule of
capture and the wildlife trust are inextricably tied, and they have been—in
one form or another—for centuries.
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